The Barnett critique after three decades: A New Keynesian analysis
📄 Summarized from the full manuscript · Human-reviewed for faithfulness before publication
In brief
Does it still matter that official money measures simply add up cash and deposits as if they were the same thing? This 2014 paper puts that decades-old objection inside a modern simulated economy where households value both currency and interest-bearing deposits. A properly weighted index tracks the model's true money aggregate so closely the two lines are visually indistinguishable, across six kinds of disturbance and a wide range of assumed substitutability, while the simple sum diverges substantially and sometimes moves the opposite way. These are simulation results, not estimates. Why it matters: mismeasurement can make money look uninformative when it is not.
What this paper finds — and why it matters
This 2014 Journal of Econometrics paper by Michael Belongia and Peter Ireland asks whether Barnett’s (1980) decades-old critique of simple-sum monetary aggregation – that adding up the nominal values of different liquid assets as if they were perfect substitutes is theoretically inconsistent with monetary aggregation theory – still applies inside a fully modern, dynamic, stochastic New Keynesian (DSGE) model. The authors build a calibrated (not estimated) NK model in which a representative household derives liquidity services from both currency and interest-bearing bank deposits through a CES aggregator (governed by a substitution elasticity omega and a steady-state currency-share parameter v), and in which a representative bank sets deposit rates through a zero-profit condition tied to a reserve ratio and a financial-sector cost shock. Using a standard quarterly Kydland-Prescott calibration (beta=0.99, a markup of 20%, benchmark omega=1.5, v matched to US M2-to-consumption and currency-to-M2 ratios over 1959-2009, and a benchmark Taylor rule with interest-smoothing 0.75 and an inflation-response coefficient of 0.30), the authors simulate impulse responses to six structural shocks – money demand, household preference, technology, bank reserve-ratio (“reserves demand”), deposit-servicing cost, and monetary policy – and compare three measures of money: the model’s true theoretical aggregate, a Divisia (Tornqvist-Theil) index built from time-varying expenditure shares, and a conventional simple-sum aggregate. The central finding is that the properly weighted Divisia quantity index tracks the true monetary aggregate’s impulse responses so closely that, plotted together, “the two lines would appear indistinguishable” (p. 11), and this holds across all six shocks and across a wide range of substitution elasticities (omega = 0.10 to 5.0) – a result the authors attribute to Diewert’s (1978) theorem that the Tornqvist-Theil Divisia index is a second-order approximation to any linear-homogeneous aggregator regardless of its true functional form or parameter values. By contrast, the simple-sum aggregate – which implicitly weights currency and deposits 1:1 as perfect substitutes – diverges substantially from the true aggregate, and can even differ in the sign of its response, especially following reserve-ratio shocks, deposit-cost shocks, and monetary policy shocks; an analogous Divisia-versus-simple-weighted-average contrast holds on the price (opportunity-cost) side of money as well. The simulations further show that under the benchmark backward-looking Taylor rule, financial-sector shocks generate persistent output declines that ordinary interest-rate policy cannot offset, because the underlying disturbance is a change in the money multiplier rather than in inflation; adding a very large output-gap response coefficient to a backward-looking Taylor rule can insulate output from all five non-technology shocks while still allowing an efficient output response to a technology shock, whereas pushing the same coefficient into a forward-looking rule specification instead produces indeterminacy. All reported results are calibration/simulation outcomes from a theoretical model – the paper contains no empirical estimation.
Summary of a classic paper, AI-assisted and human-reviewed. See the linked original for the authoritative claims and full conditions.
Questions & answers
Q1. What question does the paper ask, and what is its headline answer?
The paper asks whether Barnett’s (1980) critique of simple-sum monetary aggregation – that summing the nominal values of imperfectly substitutable liquid assets is theoretically inconsistent with aggregation theory – still holds inside a state-of-the-art dynamic, stochastic, New Keynesian macro model, and answers yes, “both qualitatively and quantitatively.” The authors extend a standard NK model to include currency and interest-bearing bank deposits as competing sources of liquidity services and show that “while a Divisia aggregate of monetary services tracks the true monetary aggregate almost perfectly, a simple-sum measure often behaves quite differently” (Abstract, p. 5). The paper is explicitly a revival and extension of Barnett’s critique into a modern DSGE setting, not a new empirical test.
Q2. How does the model generate demand for two distinct forms of money – currency and bank deposits?
The representative household’s utility depends on consumption and leisure net of a shopping-time cost, and shopping time falls as the household holds more of a CES-aggregated “effective money” bundle combining currency (N_t) and deposits (D_t). Formally, shopping time is h_t^s = (1/chi)(v_t P_t C_t / M_t^A)^chi (Eq. 2, p. 7), where the monetary aggregator is M_t^A = [v^(1/omega) N_t^((omega-1)/omega) + (1-v)^(1/omega) D_t^((omega-1)/omega)]^(omega/(omega-1)) (Eq. 3, p. 7). Here omega governs the elasticity of substitution between currency and deposits and v governs the steady-state currency share, so the household’s true liquidity demand already treats currency and deposits as imperfect, not perfect, substitutes – the assumption the simple-sum aggregate violates. A representative bank supplies deposits, holds a reserve ratio tau_t (an AR process), and sets the deposit rate through a zero-profit condition r_t^D = 1 + (r_t^L - 1)(1-tau_t) - x_t, where x_t is a financial-sector cost shock (Eq. 15, p. 8).
Q3. What are the three measures of “money” being compared, and how are the Divisia and simple-sum aggregates each constructed?
The paper compares (1) the model’s “true” theoretical aggregate M_t^A from the CES structure (Eq. 3), (2) a Divisia quantity index built from time-varying expenditure shares, and (3) a conventional simple-sum aggregate M_t^S = N_t + D_t (Eq. 24, p. 9) that adds the nominal values of currency and deposits with fixed weights of one. The Divisia quantity index growth rate is a share-weighted geometric average of the growth rates of currency and deposits, mu_t^Q = (mu_t^N)^((s_t^N+s_{t-1}^N)/2) times (mu_t^D)^((s_t^D+s_{t-1}^D)/2) (Eq. 30, p. 9), where the expenditure shares s_t^N and s_t^D are constructed from user costs and quantities (Eqs. 27-29, p. 9) and change endogenously with relative user costs. Unlike the simple-sum measure, the Divisia weights do not assume the two assets are perfect substitutes, and – critically – the Divisia index can be computed from observable quantities and prices without knowing the true functional form (3) or the parameters v and omega.
Q4. How closely does the Divisia aggregate track the true money stock in the simulations, and why does the theory predict this should work?
Across all six structural shocks, the Divisia quantity index and the true monetary aggregate produce impulse responses the authors describe as “indistinguishable” if plotted on the same graph (p. 11), and this result is robust across a wide range of assumed substitution elasticities, omega = 0.10, 0.50, 0.75, 1.5, 2.0, 5.0 (Fig. 3, p. 13). The theoretical basis is Diewert’s (1978) result that the Tornqvist-Theil Divisia index is superlative, i.e. a second-order accurate approximation to any linear-homogeneous aggregator function; the authors conclude that “specific knowledge of the true functional forms describing how households aggregate currency and deposits into a composite yielding liquidity services and specific knowledge of the parameters entering into those functional forms are not needed in constructing reliable monetary statistics” (p. 11) – i.e., the statistical agency does not need to know the household’s true preference parameters to construct a reliable monetary aggregate using Divisia methodology.
Q5. When and how badly does the simple-sum aggregate diverge from the true aggregate?
The simple-sum aggregate diverges most sharply from the true aggregate following reserves-demand shocks, deposit-cost shocks, and monetary-policy shocks, and the paper notes that following monetary policy shocks the simple-sum measure’s response can even differ in sign from the true aggregate’s. After a reserve-ratio shock, the simple-sum measure falls together with the true aggregate but with different timing and magnitude, because the Taylor-rule-driven adjustment of the monetary base does not offset the accompanying change in the money multiplier; after a deposit-cost shock (a “liquidity crunch”), the quantity index falls and the price index rises while the simple-sum measure diverges substantially. The authors summarize that “the more conventional simple-sum aggregate often behaves quite differently from its true and Divisia counterparts” (p. 11), including after preference and IS-type shocks (Fig. 2).
Q6. Does the same Divisia-versus-simple-sum contrast hold for the price side of money, not just the quantity side?
Yes: the Divisia price index tracks the model’s true opportunity-cost measure “almost as perfectly” as the Divisia quantity index tracks the true money stock, while a simple weighted-average opportunity cost measure diverges substantially after financial-sector and monetary-policy shocks (Figs. 4-6, pp. 13-15). The true opportunity cost follows Barnett’s (1978) user-cost formula, r_t - r_t^A = [v(r_t-1)^(1-omega) + (1-v)(r_t-r_t^D)^(1-omega)]^(1/(1-omega)) (Eq. 23, p. 9). The authors conclude that “for prices as well as quantities, ‘measurement matters’ in monetary economics” (p. 14).
Q7. How does the calibrated economy respond to each shock type under the benchmark Taylor rule, and what is efficient versus inefficient about those responses?
Under the benchmark backward-looking Taylor rule (interest-smoothing 0.75, inflation-response 0.30, no output-gap term), a technology shock is accommodated efficiently – output moves with the efficient level and inflation is unaffected, consistent with the Kydland-Prescott (1982) view that technology-driven output movements should not be stabilized (p. 15) – while a preference (IS) shock generates inefficient overheating that the benchmark rule only partially offsets, and financial-sector shocks (reserve-ratio and deposit-cost) generate persistent output declines with essentially no change in inflation even under a more aggressive inflation-response coefficient (Figs. 7-8, pp. 15-16). The authors explain the financial-shock result mechanically: the policy-induced increase in the monetary base “does not suffice to offset the change in either the reserve ratio or the currency-deposit ratio – more generally, the change in the money multiplier – caused by these shocks” (p. 16), so an inflation-only rule cannot see or correct the underlying disturbance.
Q8. What does the paper conclude about the optimal monetary policy response to financial-sector shocks?
The paper finds that stabilizing output against financial-sector shocks requires adding an output-gap term to the Taylor rule, and that a backward-looking specification with a very large output-gap coefficient (rho_g = 100) can insulate output from all five non-technology shocks while still permitting an efficient output response to a technology shock (Figs. 9-10, pp. 17-18); the same large coefficient in a forward-looking rule instead produces indeterminacy.* The authors caution that this conclusion “may differ considerably from what is prescribed by a standard Taylor rule specification” (p. 17) and suggest that Divisia quantity and price indexes could serve as useful real-time indicators of financial conditions during crises, citing Barnett and Chauvet (2011) (p. 18).
Q9. What limitations does the paper itself place on these results?
The authors are explicit that all results come from a calibrated theoretical model with no empirical estimation, that the bank sector is “rudimentary” (the reserve-ratio and deposit-cost processes are exogenous AR processes rather than derived from optimal bank behavior, and footnote 5 notes additional parameter restrictions are needed just to keep the reserve ratio between 0 and 1), and that the model has no heterogeneity among depositors. They also flag that the optimal-policy results “lean quite heavily on the assumption that the monetary authority can identify successfully the various shocks and thereby measure accurately the output gap in real time” (p. 17, citing Orphanides 2003), and that while the Divisia-tracks-truth result is robust across all tested values of omega, the size of the simple-sum aggregate’s divergence from the truth itself depends on omega – shrinking as currency and deposits become closer substitutes (omega to infinity) and growing for small omega, with the benchmark omega=1.5 sitting in the middle of the empirically plausible range (Fig. 3).
Key terms in this paper
Definitions below follow the paper's own usage.
- Barnett critique
- the paper's shorthand (after Barnett 1980) for the claim that simple-sum monetary aggregates -- built by adding the nominal values of assets like currency and deposits with a fixed weight of one -- are "theoretically flawed measures of money" because that fixed-weight-of-one construction implicitly assumes the component assets are perfect substitutes, when in this model's own CES structure they are not (p. 5).
- True monetary aggregate (M_t^A)
- in this paper, the model-consistent quantity of "effective money" that actually enters the household's shopping-time technology, defined by the CES aggregator over currency and deposits, M_t^A = [v^(1/omega) N_t^((omega-1)/omega) + (1-v)^(1/omega) D_t^((omega-1)/omega)]^(omega/(omega-1)) (Eq. 3); it is the benchmark against which the Divisia and simple-sum measures are judged, but in practice a statistical agency cannot observe v or omega directly.
- Divisia (quantity/price) index
- the paper's share-weighted geometric-average index of currency and deposit growth (quantity side) or of their user-cost growth (price side), with weights equal to each asset's time-varying expenditure share rather than fixed weights; per Diewert (1978) it approximates the true CES aggregator to second order without the statistician needing to know v, omega, or the true functional form.
- Simple-sum aggregate (M_t^S)
- the conventional M_t^S = N_t + D_t construction that adds the nominal values of currency and deposits with a fixed weight of one each (Eq. 24); the paper treats this fixed 1:1 weighting as the source of its divergence from the true aggregate, since it cannot register substitution between currency and deposits when their relative user costs change.
- Welfare-theoretic output gap (g_t^{y*})
- in this paper, the ratio of actual to efficient output, g_t^{y*} = Y_t/Y_t* = eta(Y_t/Z_t) (Eq. 17), used as the output-gap term that can optionally be added to the Taylor rule (with coefficient rho_g*); the paper's optimal-policy exercise is about how strongly the interest rate should respond to this specific gap measure, not to a generic output measure.