Micro Jumps, Macro Humps: Monetary Policy and Business Cycles in an Estimated HANK Model
📄 Summarized from the full manuscript · Human-reviewed for faithfulness before publication
In brief
Two facts have resisted a single model: household spending jumps sharply after a small, temporary income change, while aggregate output responds to a monetary policy shock only gradually, peaking with a delay. This paper estimates a heterogeneous-agent New Keynesian model in which households update beliefs about the aggregate economy only infrequently, and matches both. It finds investment -- not fiscal policy, which matters little once government debt has realistic long maturity -- drives most of monetary policy's effect on consumption, because high spending propensities amplify the income gains from an investment boom. The same mechanism makes investment shocks the leading source of U.S. business-cycle swings in consumption and output.
What this paper finds — and why it matters
This paper builds and estimates a Heterogeneous-Agent New Keynesian (HANK) model that simultaneously matches two sets of moments the prior literature could not reconcile: “micro jumps” – the large, immediate marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of a transitory income shock documented in household data (Fagereng, Holm and Natvik 2018) – and “macro humps” – the hump-shaped, delayed peak response of aggregate output to an identified monetary policy shock. Representative-agent models with habit formation can match the macro hump but feature MPCs far too low to match the micro jump; existing heterogeneous-agent models match high MPCs but produce an aggregate response to monetary policy that peaks immediately, failing to display a hump. The paper resolves this tension by adding “sticky expectations” (following Carroll, Crawley, Slacalek, Tokuoka and White 2018) – households update their beliefs about future aggregate variables only infrequently, though they always observe current prices and income – to an otherwise standard incomplete-markets model with long-term debt, illiquid assets, and investment adjustment costs, estimated using the sequence-space impulse-matching methodology of Auclert, Bardóczy, Rognlie and Straub (2019) to jointly fit Christiano-Eichenbaum-Evans-style monetary policy impulse responses and Smets-Wouters-style aggregate time series. Two central findings follow. First, investment plays an outsized role in monetary transmission: eliminating the investment response cuts the cumulative five-year output response by over 80%, far more than investment’s roughly 40% direct accounting share of GDP, because a rise in investment raises labor income which, given high MPCs, is largely spent, generating a consumption-investment feedback loop absent from representative-agent or simple two-agent models (which, even calibrated to the same average MPC, lack the right intertemporal-MPC profile and show almost no such amplification); by the same logic, fiscal policy turns out to be comparatively unimportant for monetary transmission once the model is calibrated with realistic five-year-duration long-term government debt and a gradual, rather than balanced-budget, fiscal adjustment rule. Second, when the model is extended with a full set of seven orthogonal shocks and re-estimated on 1966-2018 US data, investment shocks explain about 65% of business-cycle-frequency output variation and 55% of consumption variation (versus about 15% and near-zero, respectively, in the estimated representative-agent counterpart), because the same high-MPC investment-consumption complementarity that amplifies monetary transmission also lets investment shocks generate the procyclical consumption-investment comovement that representative-agent models have struggled to explain since Barro and King (1984).
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Questions & answers
Q1. What are “micro jumps” and “macro humps,” and why did the two literatures matching them separately fail to match each other?
Household-level data show consumption “jumps” on impact after a transitory income shock – an elevated MPC followed by continued elevated spending – while aggregate output’s response to an identified monetary policy shock is “hump-shaped,” peaking only several quarters after the shock (Introduction, pp. 2-3, Figure 1). The authors state plainly: “as is well-known, representative-agent models feature MPCs that are much too low compared to the data, so models in the macro moments tradition fail to match micro jumps. Similarly, existing heterogeneous-agent models feature an aggregate impulse response to monetary policy that is peaked on impact… so models in the micro moments tradition fail to match macro humps, and are therefore ill-suited for estimation using macro data” (p. 2).
Q2. What is “sticky expectations,” and how does it let one model match both moments?
Households update their beliefs about future aggregate variables only with i.i.d. probability 1-θ each period – basing forecasts on information from k periods ago if they have not updated – while always observing and correctly responding to their own current income and interest rate, so borrowing constraints are never violated on stale information (Section 2.3, eq. 4, pp. 9-10). Because “a one-time unanticipated income shock does not change future incomes or interest rates,” intertemporal MPCs themselves are left unchanged by the friction; but “slow adjustment of expectations allows us to model hump-shaped impulse responses to macroeconomic shocks” (p. 10), since households dampen their ex-ante intertemporal substitution and income effects until the shock’s consequences actually show up in their observed income.
Q3. What are the model’s other main ingredients besides heterogeneity and sticky expectations?
The estimated model features sticky prices and wages with indexation, long-term government debt calibrated to the five-year average US duration, and investment subject to adjustment costs (Section 3, throughout; Section 5.3, p. 30, fn. 33: “to our knowledge, this is the first quantitative HANK model to feature long-term debt”). Households hold both a liquid and an illiquid asset, as in Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2018)-style two-asset HANK models, which is why the paper can further decompose consumption responses into contributions from liquid returns, illiquid returns, and labor income (Section 5.2).
Q4. How is the model estimated, and what does it target?
The paper uses the sequence-space impulse-matching procedure of Auclert, Bardóczy, Rognlie and Straub (2019), extended with a new methodology for handling non-rational-expectations models, to match (a) a set of macro monetary-policy impulse responses in the tradition of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), and (b) a set of macro aggregate time series in the tradition of Smets and Wouters (2007) (Introduction, p. 4; Section 4). For the full seven-shock model (Section 6), the authors estimate shock AR/MA parameters and standard deviations by computing the log-likelihood directly from sequence-space impulse responses over 1966 Q1-2018 Q4 US data on output, consumption, investment, wages, hours, inflation, and the nominal interest rate, noting the whole procedure “is reliable and fast, even on a laptop computer,” taking about 120 seconds (Section 6.2, pp. 37-38).
Q5. What exactly is the investment-amplification result, and how large is it quantitatively?
Shutting off the investment response to a monetary shock (by setting the adjustment-cost parameter to infinity while holding the real-rate path fixed) reduces the peak output response by 69% and the cumulative 20-quarter output response by 84% – “far larger than investment’s direct share of the output response, which at peak is slightly less than 40%” (Section 5.1, pp. 27-28). The reason is that shutting off investment also sharply weakens the consumption response (peak falls 49%, cumulative falls 72%): “this reflects a powerful investment-consumption feedback that is unique to models with high MPCs: as investment rises, the additional output demand leads to a rise in labor income – much of which is spent on consumption by high-MPC households, leading to even more output demand” (p. 28). In the estimated representative-agent model with habits, by contrast, shutting off investment lowers output only by its direct 38% accounting share, with no change in the consumption impulse at all, “since it is pinned down by the path of real interest rates and intertemporal substitution via the Euler equation” (p. 28).
Q6. Why can’t a simple two-agent (TANK) model, calibrated to the same average MPC, reproduce this amplification?
Even a two-agent model with a 20% hand-to-mouth share, habits, and the same average quarterly MPC, estimated to match the same impulse responses, shows consumption “barely affected when investment is shut off” – “because a two-agent model, even if it has the same average MPC, cannot match the intertemporal MPCs… [and] therefore misses important intertemporal feedbacks from investment to consumption” (Section 5.1, p. 28, and appendix E.1). This is the paper’s central methodological point: matching the average MPC is not enough; matching the full intertemporal MPC profile (how spending responds to income shocks at various future horizons) is what generates the amplification mechanism.
Q7. What does decomposing the consumption response into direct and indirect effects reveal?
Following Kaplan, Moll and Violante’s (2018) direct/indirect decomposition, the paper finds that “almost the entire consumption response is accounted for by indirect effects” (via illiquid returns and, above all, labor income) while “the direct effect is almost absent” – a finding the authors call “even more extreme” than Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2018) (Section 5.2, eq. 25, Figure 6, p. 29). Switching off inattention while feeding in the same equilibrium price/income paths reveals the direct effect is “alive and well” absent the sticky-expectations friction, showing that inattention specifically dampens intertemporal substitution – “an activity that relies on changes in future expected interest rates” – and is, in the authors’ words, a friction that “must” be present for the model to avoid an implausibly large impact consumption response inconsistent with the micro data (Section 5.2, p. 30).
Q8. Why does fiscal policy turn out to be unimportant for monetary transmission in this model, contrary to Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2018)?
Two features drive this result: long-term government debt (five-year US-average duration, limiting how much debt must be rolled over at the new interest rate each quarter) and a fiscal rule that adjusts the budget gradually toward a steady-state debt target rather than via a balanced budget every period (Section 5.3, pp. 30-31). Under this baseline, “it still makes minimal difference whether the government adjusts τ, G, or T, nor does it matter much whether the debt itself is short- or long-term” (p. 31); the Kaplan-Moll-Violante-style ranking of fiscal instruments (spending first, then lump-sum transfers, then tax rates) reappears only under the less realistic combination of short-term debt and an immediate balanced-budget rule, where “fiscal policy can play a major role… with a peak output effect that is twice as large as our baseline” (p. 31).
Q9. What does the paper find about the sources of US business cycles once the model is re-estimated with a full set of shocks?
In the estimated representative-agent model, supply shocks (TFP and markups) explain over half of business-cycle-frequency output variation and just under half of consumption variation, with investment shocks explaining only about 15% of output variation and essentially none of consumption variation (Section 6.3, Figure 11, p. 38). In the estimated HA model, by contrast, “investment shocks rise to prominence”: they explain about 65% of output variation and 55% of consumption variation at business-cycle horizons, while supply shocks “become far less important” (Figure 12, p. 38) – a stark difference driven purely by the household side of the model, since the two estimations share the same shock specification.
Q10. How does the paper’s mechanism resolve the Barro-King (1984) consumption-investment comovement puzzle?
In the representative-agent model, investment shocks explain “almost none of the covariance of consumption and investment,” reproducing the classic Barro and King (1984) puzzle that investment-driven business-cycle models struggle to generate procyclical consumption without appealing to supply shocks; in the HA model, “investment shocks drive most of the covariance,” a “striking consequence of the model’s investment-consumption complementarity when MPCs are high” (Section 6.3, Figure 13, pp. 38-39). Impulse responses to a pure investment shock make the contrast visible directly: in the HA model consumption and investment “move together and peak at similar times,” whereas in the RA model there is only “a tiny and (due to habit formation) highly backloaded consumption response” (p. 39, Figure 14) – the same investment-consumption feedback responsible for the paper’s monetary-transmission result also resolves this longstanding business-cycle puzzle.
Key terms in this paper
Definitions below follow the paper's own usage.
- Micro jumps and macro humps
- The paper's central tension: household-level studies (e.g. Fagereng, Holm and Natvik 2018) find consumption jumps sharply on impact after a transitory income shock (a high marginal propensity to consume, or MPC) and only gradually tapers off, whereas aggregate output's response to an identified monetary policy shock is hump-shaped, peaking only after several quarters. "As is well-known, representative-agent models feature MPCs that are much too low compared to the data... [while] existing heterogeneous-agent models feature an aggregate impulse response to monetary policy that is peaked on impact... and are therefore ill-suited for estimation using macro data" (Introduction) -- the paper's stated goal is a single model matching both.
- Sticky expectations
- The information friction (following Carroll, Crawley, Slacalek, Tokuoka and White 2018) in which each household updates its beliefs about future *aggregate* variables only with i.i.d. probability 1-θ each period, while always observing and reacting correctly to its own current income and interest rate; households that have not updated base forecasts on stale information from k periods ago. "Slow adjustment of expectations allows us to model hump-shaped impulse responses to macroeconomic shocks" (Section 2.3) while leaving intertemporal MPCs themselves unchanged, since "a one-time unanticipated income shock does not change future incomes or interest rates" and so does not interact with the friction.
- Investment-consumption amplification
- The paper's first main finding: shutting off the investment response to a monetary policy shock (by setting the investment adjustment-cost parameter to infinity) reduces the cumulative 20-quarter output response by 84% and the peak consumption response by 49%, far more than investment's roughly 40% direct share of output. The mechanism: "as investment rises, the additional output demand leads to a rise in household income, which -- thanks to high MPCs -- causes consumption to rise, making an additional contribution to output demand" (Introduction) -- a feedback loop the paper shows is absent in representative-agent and even two-agent models matched to the same average MPC, because those models do not match the full intertemporal MPC profile.
- Direct vs. indirect effects of monetary policy on consumption
- A decomposition (following Kaplan, Moll and Violante 2018) of the aggregate consumption response to a shock into a direct effect (from the path of liquid real interest rates, via intertemporal substitution) and indirect effects (from the path of illiquid returns and, especially, aggregate labor income). The paper finds that "almost the entire consumption response is accounted for by indirect effects" and that "the direct effect is almost absent" -- a finding it calls "even more extreme" than Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2018) -- and shows this near-absence is driven specifically by sticky expectations dampening intertemporal substitution (Section 5.2).
- Muted role of fiscal policy in monetary transmission
- The paper's finding that, once the model is calibrated with long-term government debt (five-year average US duration) and a fiscal rule that adjusts gradually rather than via a balanced budget each quarter, "fiscal policy [is] surprisingly unimportant for monetary transmission" (Section 5.3) -- the choice of tax, spending, or transfer instrument used to balance the budget makes almost no difference to the output response. This contrasts with Kaplan, Moll and Violante (2018), where fiscal policy is an important indirect channel; the paper shows their ranking of instruments (G, then lump-sum transfers, then taxes) reappears only under the less realistic assumptions of short-term debt and a balanced-budget rule.