Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation
📄 Summarized from the full manuscript (open-access HTML) · Human-reviewed for faithfulness before publication
In brief
If a country saves more, does its economy grow faster forever, or just reach a higher level of output before settling back to its old pace? Working independently around the same time as Robert Solow, this 1956 paper shows that once machines and workers can be combined in flexible proportions, an economy settles toward growing at the same pace as its population, regardless of how much it saves -- only the level of output per person, not the long-run growth rate, responds to thrift. Ongoing improvements in technology are what can lift growth permanently higher. A lengthy appendix separately defends how the model measures capital.
What this paper finds — and why it matters
Trevor Swan’s 1956 paper illustrates, with two diagrams, the connexion between capital accumulation and the growth of the productive labour force in a one-sector economy, then devotes a long appendix to defending the neoclassical treatment of capital as a factor of production against Joan Robinson’s contemporaneous critique. In the main text, output is produced from capital K and labour N under a constant-returns production function Y = K^a * N^b (a+b=1), giving the growth-accounting identity y = as(Y/K) + bn, where s is the saving ratio and n the (initially constant) rate of growth of the labour force. Plotting growth rates against the output-capital ratio, the growth line of capital (a ray of slope s through the origin), the horizontal growth line of labour (at n), and the growth line of output (their weighted average) must intersect at a single point, where the output-capital ratio settles and the whole economy grows at rate n regardless of the saving ratio – a higher saving ratio permanently raises the level of output per head reached along the way, and briefly accelerates growth during the transition, but does not raise the long-run equilibrium growth rate itself. Adding a constant rate of “neutral” technical progress shifts the growth line of output upward and establishes a new equilibrium at which output per head is not merely permanently higher but perpetually rising, at a rate that exceeds the rate of technical progress itself because capital’s own growth is sustained at a higher level too. Introducing land as a third, fixed factor (Section 3) converts the model into an explicitly classical one: the growth line of capital now lies everywhere above the “Ricardian line” (the locus of population-growth/output-capital-ratio combinations consistent with a constant standard of living), so that, absent technical progress, the output-capital ratio falls indefinitely toward a stationary state at the origin – a mechanism Swan reads as the formal counterpart of the classical doctrine that accumulation ultimately leads to stagnation, checked only if technical progress raises the Ricardian line fast enough. Section 4 shows the model is formally equivalent to Harrod’s warranted/natural-rate apparatus, with the growth line of capital as Harrod’s warranted rate and the growth line of output as the natural rate. The paper’s substantial Appendix, “Notes on Capital,” then takes up Joan Robinson’s contemporaneous claim that Capital cannot be given an operative meaning as a factor of production even in a stationary state: using a “scarecrow” model of durable, freely-reshapable “meccano set” capital, Swan argues that at the margin of a single stationary equilibrium capital can validly be measured as “an equilibrium dollar’s worth” without needing a natural technical unit, reworks Wicksell’s point-input/point-output and Akerman durable-equipment models to show the same marginal-productivity apparatus applies there too, and shows that the “Wicksell effect” – part of an increase in social capital being absorbed by rising wages and falling interest rather than appearing as extra physical capital – can run in either direction (the “Wicksell effect in reverse”), which he takes as evidence against Robinson’s claim that the effect is “the key to the whole theory of accumulation and of the determination of wages and profits.”
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Questions & answers
Q1. What is the paper’s stated aim, and how does Swan frame its relationship to Solow’s work?
Swan states his aim as being “to illustrate with two diagrams a theme common to Adam Smith, Mill, and Lewis… namely, the connexion between capital accumulation and the growth of the productive labour force” (Section 1, p. 334), explicitly situating the exercise within the classical tradition even though “our illustration takes a neo-classical form.” In a footnote to the growth diagram, Swan notes that “a similar device is used by R. M. Solow (‘A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1956)” (p. 337, fn. 6) – the two papers were developed independently and close together in time, which is why the resulting framework is now conventionally called the Solow-Swan model.
Q2. What is the basic “unclassical” model, and how does the growth diagram (Figure 1) work?
With capital and labour as the only two factors under a constant-elasticity production function Y = K^a*N^b (a+b=1), logarithmic differentiation gives the basic growth-accounting formula y = as(Y/K) + bn, where y is output’s relative growth rate, s the saving ratio, and n labour’s relative growth rate (Section 2, p. 335). In Figure 1, the growth line of capital is a ray of slope s through the origin (since capital’s growth rate is s times the output-capital ratio); the growth line of labour is horizontal at height n; and the growth line of output lies between them, dividing the vertical distance in the proportion a:b. Because a+b=1, all three lines must intersect at a single point, where growth in each case equals n – and, crucially, the position of this intersection along the horizontal (output-capital-ratio) axis, not the common growth rate, is what a higher saving ratio shifts (p. 336).
Q3. If a country raises its saving ratio, what actually changes – the growth rate or the level of output?
Only the level. Swan traces the transition from a 5 percent to a 10 percent saving ratio: the growth line of output shifts, and “output per head begins to improve” as the economy moves to a new equilibrium with a permanently higher output-capital ratio and wage rate, but the improvement occurs “at an ever-slackening pace” during the transition and the long-run growth rate returns to the same value, n, as before – “this conclusion is not really surprising. It is in fact the counterpart in our present unclassical model of the classical proposition that capital accumulation leads ultimately to the stationary state” (p. 338). Swan flags the numerical result as “at first sight disconcerting”: in his example, doubling the saving ratio at a point where capital yields 8 percent adds only 0.4 percentage points to the growth rate at the moment of the change (p. 338).
Q4. What happens when constant technical progress is added?
A constant rate of “neutral” technical progress (m percent per year) shifts the growth line of output upward by m, producing a new equilibrium point at which the output-capital ratio and profit rate are permanently higher, and – the key qualitative change – output per head is not just permanently higher but perpetually rising (p. 337). Its rate of rise actually exceeds m, “because the contribution of capital is also sustained by technical progress at a higher level” (p. 337). Swan also works out the case where population growth itself responds to a demand for progressively rising living standards (a target improvement rate q in output per head): this is formally equivalent to reducing the effective rate of technical progress by q, and the resulting family of growth lines (indexed by q) can be read as “a grid that divides the economic map into characteristic zones of improvement or determination in output per head” rather than literal time paths (pp. 341-342). A higher saving ratio, in this reading, does not change growth rates at the equilibrium points but shifts the whole grid so as to enlarge the region of the map corresponding to rising output per head (p. 342).
Q5. How does introducing land as a fixed factor change the picture (Section 3), and what is the “Ricardian line”?
With land as a third factor of fixed supply and production elasticity gamma (so a+b+gamma=1, a+b<1), land drops out of the growth formula itself but reduces the sum a+b below unity, so the growth line of output now cuts the growth line of capital below the horizontal growth line of labour (p. 340). Swan defines the Ricardian line as the locus of (labour-growth-rate, output-capital-ratio) pairs consistent with constant output per head, obtained by setting y=n in the growth formula. “Except at the origin, the growth line of capital lies above the Ricardian line, for capital must always grow faster than labour in order to sustain output per head in the face of continually diminishing returns on the land” – but since capital is then also growing faster than output, the output-capital ratio continually falls, and “the natural progress of society continues indefinitely towards the origin,” where the growth line of capital and the Ricardian line finally meet in “a stationary state” (p. 340). Swan explicitly reads this as the diagrammatic counterpart of the classical prediction that a very low rate of profit eventually “arrests all accumulation” (p. 341).
Q6. Can this classical stagnation be avoided, and how does the model connect to Malthusian population dynamics?
A constant rate of technical progress can permanently lift the Ricardian line above the level that would otherwise gravitate to the origin, producing a stable equilibrium with a positive, constant growth rate of output per head instead of stagnation – “so instead of gravitating towards the origin, the economy if necessary levitates to this stable equilibrium point” (p. 341). Swan immediately flags the tension this creates with the underlying diminishing-returns story: if population is assumed to grow forever at whatever rate is implied (in his example, about 2.9 percent), “it is very likely that at some point diminishing returns will set in with a violence not allowed for in our production function” – i.e., the model’s own assumption of a constant land-elasticity gamma cannot literally hold forever under a Malthusian population response (p. 341).
Q7. How does Swan relate his diagram to Harrod’s warranted- and natural-rate framework (Section 4)?
Swan states that his model “differs from Harrod’s model of economic growth only in that it systematizes the relations between the ‘warranted’ and ’natural’ rates of growth, and introduces land as a fixed factor” (p. 342). The growth line of capital, s(Y/K), corresponds point-for-point to Harrod’s warranted rate (since the output-capital ratio is the reciprocal of Harrod’s capital coefficient Cr); the growth line of output corresponds to Harrod’s natural rate; and their intersection is the point where warranted and natural rates coincide. Swan uses this correspondence to correct what he describes as a misreading of Harrod by some readers, who took Harrod to mean that equality of the warranted and natural rates could occur only “by a fluke”: Swan quotes Harrod’s own statement that policy should aim at “a progressive reduction in the rate of interest” via a “deepening” factor d until the output-capital ratio adjusts, arguing that “the mechanism of Figures 1 and 2 merely makes explicit what this statement implies” (p. 343).
Q8. What is Joan Robinson’s objection to treating Capital as a factor of production, and how does Swan’s “scarecrow” model respond (Appendix, Part I)?
Robinson’s objection, as Swan quotes it, is that the standard neo-classical notation “O = f(L,C)” conceals an unresolved question of what unit C (capital) is measured in: measuring capital “in terms of product” is natural for discussing accumulation, but “when we consider what addition to productive resources a given amount of accumulation makes, we must measure capital in labour units,” and “one symbol, C, cannot stand both for a quantity of product and a quantity of labour time” (p. 344, quoting Robinson). Swan’s response constructs a “scarecrow” economy of homogeneous labour and land plus capital in the form of durable, freely-reassemblable “meccano sets,” in which the basic model of the text “could be rigorously established in a form that would deceive nobody” (p. 344) – and then argues that Robinson conflates two distinct senses of “capital measured in terms of product”: (1) the current value of the pre-existing capital stock, which is revalued whenever relative prices between capital goods and product change, versus (2) the cumulated historical cost of past saving and investment, which is the neo-classical tradition’s “perpetual inventory” measure; “the two measures may in fact diverge very widely” away from a stationary state, but “in a stationary equilibrium, the two measures coincide,” and for marginal comparative-statics analysis around a single equilibrium, capital can validly be treated as “an equilibrium dollar’s worth” regardless of its physical composition (pp. 348-350).
Q9. Does Swan think this defence fully rescues the neoclassical treatment of capital?
No – he concedes an important limitation. The “equilibrium dollar’s worth” argument, resting on what Swan calls “the familiar… Wong-Viner-Harrod envelope theorem,” is valid only for marginal (“virtual”) displacements around a single equilibrium point, not for comparing two different stationary states “in the large” with different factor endowments: “comparative statics” is, on these terms, “a misnomer: not different situations, but only ‘virtual’ displacements at the margin of one situation, can be considered” (p. 351). For genuine structural comparisons between two stationary states, Swan concludes that either capital must be measurable in a naturally homogeneous technical unit (as with meccano sets), or an artificial device is needed – he points to Champernowne’s proposed “chain index” of capital, and dedicates the rest of the appendix to showing how such a chain index “emerges naturally” from Wicksell’s analysis of the specific problems Robinson raised (p. 351).
Q10. What is “the Wicksell effect,” and how does Swan derive it (Appendix, Part II)?
Reworking Wicksell’s “point-input, point-output” model – labour N applied at a point in time yields, after a “period of production” t, a final output Q=Nf(t), with the real wage as the discounted product per unit of labour and the interest rate as the marginal productivity of waiting – Swan shows that the proportional change in the value of capital splits into a “productive” component and a “financial” (revaluation) component (Part II, pp. 352-357). The Wicksell effect is Wicksell’s finding that an increase in the social capital stock is “partly absorbed by increased wages and rent,” so that only the residual is “really effective as far as a rise in production is concerned” – in this model, increasing the value of capital always means a rising wage rate and falling interest rate, and the net effect is necessarily a rise in the value of a unit of capital in terms of product, which Swan characterizes as “an apparent absorption of capital” (Part IV, p. 359) rather than a change in physically productive capacity.
Q11. How does the analysis extend to durable capital equipment (Akerman’s problem), and what is the “Wicksell effect in reverse”?
Part III reworks Wicksell’s solution to Gustaf Akerman’s problem of durable capital equipment (“axes” of a chosen optimal service life n years, forming in equilibrium a “balanced equipment” of uniform age distribution from 0 to n), deriving the Champernowne-Kahn formula for the value of such equipment as a proportion of its replacement cost, and showing the same neoclassical marginal-productivity apparatus applies once capital is measured in a “standard axe” (p. 358-359). Part IV shows that in this durable-equipment setting, unlike the earlier point-input model, the “financial” (interest-rate) component of a capital revaluation can outweigh the “productive” (wage) component, so that the value of a standard axe can actually fall even as wages rise and the interest rate falls – the Wicksell effect in reverse (p. 359-360). Swan notes this reversal left Wicksell himself “very puzzled” and forced him to concede his earlier absorption explanation was “not general” (p. 360), but argues that once the effect is understood purely as a revaluation phenomenon, there is “nothing perverse about it,” and “in general there is no presumption either way” as to its direction (p. 360) – which Swan closes by using to question Joan Robinson’s claim that Wicksell’s finding is “the key to the whole theory of accumulation and of the determination of wages and profits” (p. 361).
Key terms in this paper
Definitions below follow the paper's own usage.
- Growth line of capital
- in the paper's growth-rate diagram (Figure 1), the line through the origin with slope equal to the saving ratio s, showing capital's relative rate of growth (K-dot/K = s times the output-capital ratio Y/K) as a function of the output-capital ratio; together with the horizontal growth line of labour (at rate n) it determines the growth line of output, and the point where all three intersect is the economy's equilibrium output-capital ratio.
- The Ricardian line
- the locus, in the same diagram, of all combinations of the labour-growth rate and the output-capital ratio consistent with a constant standard of output per head in the classical (land-as-fixed-factor) case; since capital must always grow faster than labour to offset diminishing returns on fixed land, the growth line of capital lies above the Ricardian line everywhere except at the origin, so that, absent technical progress, the output-capital ratio is drawn ever downward toward a stationary state.
- The "scarecrow" (meccano-set) model of capital
- Swan's illustrative model of capital as a stock of durable, cost-free-to-reshape "meccano sets" combined with homogeneous labour and land, used to show that the neoclassical production function could in principle be given a rigorous technical basis; deployed in the Appendix to isolate exactly which of Joan Robinson's objections to treating Capital as a factor of production do, and do not, survive once the scarecrow's simplifying assumptions are relaxed.
- The Wicksell effect
- Wicksell's finding, in a model where capital is valued "in terms of product," that part of an increase in the social capital stock is absorbed by a rise in wages and a fall in the interest rate rather than showing up as additional physically productive capital -- a revaluation of the existing stock rather than new physical capital; Joan Robinson treated this as central to the whole theory of the determination of wages and profits.
- The Wicksell effect in reverse
- the case, arising in Wicksell's analysis of Akerman's problem of durable capital equipment, in which the interest-rate component of a capital revaluation outweighs the wage component, so that a rise in wages and fall in the interest rate is accompanied by a *fall*, not a rise, in the value of a "standard" unit of capital equipment in terms of product; Swan argues this reversal is unremarkable once the Wicksell effect is understood as a pure revaluation phenomenon that carries no general presumption about direction.