<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/journal/philosophical-transactions-of-the-royal-society-a-mathematical-physical-and-engineering-sciences/</link><description>Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/journal/philosophical-transactions-of-the-royal-society-a-mathematical-physical-and-engineering-sciences/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Partial differential equation models in macroeconomics</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/partial-differential-equation-models-in-macroeconomics/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/partial-differential-equation-models-in-macroeconomics/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Written explicitly to get mathematicians interested in macroeconomics, this review collects the systems of coupled nonlinear partial differential equations that arise once a macro model tracks a whole population of heterogeneous households or firms in continuous time &amp;ndash; a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for one atomistic agent&amp;rsquo;s optimal control, paired with an equation for how the cross-sectional distribution evolves &amp;ndash; and states, family by family, which of their basic properties are proved and which remain open. The authors are candid that this is the paper&amp;rsquo;s purpose: they &amp;ldquo;present a number of examples of such PDEs, discuss what is known about their properties, and list some open questions for future research,&amp;rdquo; and they call the pairing a &amp;ldquo;mean field game&amp;rdquo; after Lasry and Lions, noting that while each equation type is individually well understood, &amp;ldquo;our understanding of the coupled system is much more limited.&amp;rdquo; Five families are covered. The continuous-time Huggett-Aiyagari-Bewley model of income and wealth distribution (§2) yields a stationary HJB/Fokker-Planck pair in which the borrowing constraint, treated as a state constraint, makes the optimal saving drift behave like the square root of distance to the floor, so the stationary wealth density is unbounded and carries a Dirac mass exactly at the constraint for all incomes below a threshold; existence of a stationary equilibrium is proved in the companion Achdou-Lasry-Lions-Moll work, but uniqueness, and both existence and uniqueness of the time-dependent equilibrium, are listed as open. Models of power laws (§3) run on the Gabaix mechanism — geometric Brownian motion plus a small friction gives a stationary density that is exactly a power law with exponent ζ = 1 − 2μ̄/σ̄² — and become genuinely hard once an optimal-stopping exit decision, in the form of a variational inequality of the obstacle type, makes the minimum size endogenous. Knowledge-diffusion growth models (§4) replace the local Fokker-Planck law of motion with non-local Fisher-KPP or Boltzmann-type equations whose travelling-wave solutions deliver the closed-form pairing growth = σ√(2α) and tail inequality 1/ζ = σ/√(2α), implying a growth-inequality trade-off in the experimentation parameter σ but not in the diffusion parameter α, where higher diffusion raises growth and lowers inequality simultaneously. Business-cycle models with aggregate shocks (§5) are the hardest: the cross-sectional distribution becomes a random variable that must enter each individual&amp;rsquo;s own state space, producing an &amp;ldquo;HJB equation in the space of density functions&amp;rdquo; whose existence, uniqueness and numerical approximation are all open, and which the authors sidestep in practice by allowing shocks only at finitely many dates (ten shocks giving 2¹⁰ = 1024 finite-dimensional paths). Finally §6 notes that oligopoly applications with a finite number of strategic firms take the form of a differential game rather than a mean field game. The scope condition on the whole exercise is stated in the conclusion: this is a research agenda, an area the authors see &amp;ldquo;large &amp;lsquo;gains from trade&amp;rsquo;&amp;rdquo; in, not a set of settled economic findings — and the paper itself notes two places where these calibrated models fail quantitatively against data.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>