R14 | Macro Paper Warehouse

Slum Upgrading and Long-Run Urban Development: Evidence from Indonesia

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

This paper estimates the long-term causal effects of the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP), one of the world’s largest slum upgrading programs, on urban development in Jakarta, Indonesia. KIP ran from 1969 to 1984 across three staggered waves (Pelita I-III), covered 110 square kilometers (25% of Jakarta’s area), and served approximately 5 million residents at a total cost of roughly $500 million (2015 USD). The program provided basic physical upgrades — paved roads and footpaths, sanitation and drainage, and community buildings such as schools and health clinics — along with a verbal non-eviction guarantee for 15 years. Residents were not relocated.

The central research question is whether preserving slums through upgrading entails long-run dynamic inefficiency: as Jakarta formalizes, do KIP areas lag behind non-KIP areas in ways that generate opportunity costs from land misallocation?

The authors assemble high-resolution data on KIP policy boundaries, current assessed land values (nearly 20,000 sub-blocks), building heights from a novel photographic survey of 19,518 pixels stratified across Jakarta, and multiple novel measures of informality — a rank-based photographic index (0 to 4), an attributes-based index across fifteen binary characteristics, and administrative data on unregistered land-parcel titles. They also use digitized historical maps from 1937 and 1959 to identify pre-KIP kampung boundaries.

Two empirical strategies address program selection bias (KIP planners prioritized the worst-condition kampungs first). The first restricts the sample to historical kampungs that existed before KIP and includes locality fixed effects, comparing treated kampungs against nearby untreated ones within the same neighborhood. The second is a boundary discontinuity design (BDD) comparing observations within 200 meters of KIP boundaries. Both strategies include eighteen predetermined controls for historical landmarks, infrastructure, and topography including flood proneness.

Average effects (robust across both strategies): KIP areas today have land values approximately 14-17 log points (roughly 15%) lower than observably equivalent non-KIP areas, and are about 8-12 percentage points less likely to contain buildings taller than three floors — half the control-group mean of 0.24. KIP areas are more informal across all three informality metrics: the rank-based index is higher by 0.29 standard deviations, the attributes-based index by 0.05 SD units, and the share of unregistered parcels is 3 percentage points higher. Building heights corroborate the land-value finding: imputing the hedonic value of missing tall buildings in KIP accounts for approximately 90% of the aggregate land-value impact ($2.2 billion of $2.4 billion).

Heterogeneity by real estate potential is a central finding. The authors construct a predicted land index for 2,058 hamlets in Jakarta using non-KIP land values. In the lowest quintile (Q5), KIP areas show a positive and statistically significant effect of +10 log points on land values, consistent with direct capitalization of the upgrades. This effect reverses in higher-potential areas: the estimate reaches -28 log points in Q2 and -30 log points in Q1, as non-KIP neighborhoods formalize while KIP areas lag.

Surplus calculations integrating land values, building heights, horizontal built-up coverage (35% for KIP vs. 18% for non-KIP), and demand and supply elasticities reveal that 90% of total surplus losses are concentrated in the top two quintiles (Q1 and Q2), which comprise 47% of KIP’s coverage area. In Q1, KIP surplus is lower by $2,369 per square meter; in Q2, the gap is $1,044 per square meter. In the bottom two quintiles, KIP delivers greater surplus (up to +$347 per square meter in Q5), covering an estimated 3 million residents across 57 square kilometers.

Mechanisms consistent with delayed formalization include significantly higher population density in KIP areas (+33 log points, or 39%) and greater land fragmentation (+9 parcels per pixel relative to a non-KIP mean of 19), both of which raise relocation and land assembly costs. The original KIP investments show no differential effect by type or intensity after four decades, consistent with their 15-year projected useful life. Endogenous sorting is ruled out as a confounder: if anything, educational attainment is slightly higher in KIP areas.

Q: What is the Kampung Improvement Program (KIP) and what did it provide? A: KIP was a slum upgrading program implemented in Jakarta, Indonesia from 1969 to 1984 across three five-year plan waves (Pelita I, II, III). It covered 110 square kilometers and 5 million residents at a total cost of approximately $500 million (2015 USD). The program provided three categories of basic physical improvements — vehicular and pedestrian road access, sanitation and drainage infrastructure, and community buildings (schools, health clinics) — along with a verbal non-eviction guarantee for 15 years. Crucially, upgrades were designed to be basic, with a planned useful life of only 15 years, to avoid attracting higher-income groups.

Q: What is the core research question and theoretical concern motivating the paper? A: The paper asks whether slum upgrading programs, while immediately beneficial to residents, entail dynamic inefficiency by delaying formalization as cities develop. The concern is that preserving slums through upgrades and non-eviction guarantees can create opportunity costs from land misallocation when surrounding areas formalize and redevelop into higher-value formal structures. This is framed as a trade-off between the direct welfare benefits of upgrading (affordable in-situ housing for millions) and the long-run costs to urban land productivity.

Q: How does the paper address the selection bias problem — KIP targeted the worst-condition kampungs first? A: Two complementary strategies are used. First, the historical kampung specification restricts the sample to areas that were kampungs before KIP (from 1937 and 1959 maps) and includes locality fixed effects, so treated and control units are compared within the same neighborhood and share the same real estate market by assumption. Second, a boundary discontinuity design (BDD) compares observations within 200 meters of KIP boundaries with boundary fixed effects and quadratic distance controls. A falsification test using sequential KIP waves confirms the approach: the raw data shows a monotonic pattern (Wave I worst: -0.40 log points, Wave II: -0.29, Wave III: -0.17) consistent with selection bias, but this pattern disappears in the historical kampung specification (Wave I: -0.13, Wave II: -0.11, Wave III: -0.14), supporting the identification assumption.

Q: What are the average effects of KIP on land values and building heights? A: In the historical kampung specification, KIP areas have land values 14 log points (approximately 15%) lower than non-KIP historical kampungs within the same locality. The BDD estimate is similar at -17 log points. For building heights, KIP areas are 12 percentage points less likely to contain a building taller than three floors in the historical kampung sample (8 percentage points in the BDD), relative to a non-KIP control mean of 0.24 — meaning KIP areas are roughly half as likely to have tall buildings. The average effect on floors is -1.6 floors, relative to a control mean of 5 floors.

Q: How do the authors validate that land value estimates are not distorted by measurement error in informal areas? A: The authors impute the hedonic value of missing tall buildings in KIP using a hedonic regression estimated solely on non-KIP historical kampungs. KIP areas have 145 fewer buildings with more than ten floors; combined with a 57% price premium for tall buildings (relative to a base price of 13.4 million Rupiahs per square meter), the implied land value loss from missing buildings above ten floors is approximately $1.3 billion, and from buildings between four and ten floors is $0.9 billion, for a total imputed effect of $2.2 billion. This accounts for approximately 90% of the aggregate land value impact from the historical kampung specification ($2.4 billion), assuaging concerns that lower measured land values in KIP reflect data quality differences rather than true price gaps.

Q: How does the KIP effect vary across the distribution of real estate potential? A: The authors construct a predicted land index for 2,058 Jakarta hamlets by regressing non-KIP log land values on hamlet fixed effects, then rank hamlets into quintiles. In Q5 (lowest predicted land values, least likely to formalize), KIP areas show a statistically significant positive effect of +10 log points on land values, consistent with direct capitalization of the upgrades. Moving to higher-potential areas, the effect attenuates and reverses: it is -28 log points in Q2 and -30 log points in Q1, where non-KIP areas have formalized. This cross-sectional pattern traces out the dynamic inefficiency predicted by theory.

Q: What informality measures does the paper construct and what do they show? A: The paper constructs three complementary informality metrics. First, a rank-based photographic index (0 = very formal, 4 = very informal) coded by two trained Jakarta-based research assistants from approximately 28,000 hand-coded photographs, with inter-rater correlation of 0.78. Second, an attributes-based index averaging fifteen binary characteristics across vehicular access, neighborhood appearance, and structural permanence, standardized to a z-score. Third, the area share of unregistered land parcels from the Indonesian National Land Agency’s 2020 digital land maps. KIP areas score higher on all three: the rank-based index is higher by 0.29 SD units, the attributes-based index by 0.05 SD units, and the unregistered parcel share is higher by 3 percentage points.

Q: What mechanisms explain why KIP areas remain informal and have lower land values? A: The paper identifies three mutually reinforcing mechanisms. First, KIP areas have significantly higher population density (+33 log points or 39% in the historical kampung sample, equivalent to 51 more people per pixel), which raises relocation costs. Second, KIP areas have greater land fragmentation, with 9 more parcels per pixel relative to a non-KIP mean of 19, exacerbating holdout problems during land assembly; a back-of-the-envelope calculation attributes a 9% land value effect (60% of the total 15% effect) to this channel. Third, the verbal non-eviction guarantees and improved conditions likely strengthened residents’ tenure perceptions and encouraged them to stay, leading to sub-division of parcels over time. The original KIP investments show no differential effect by type after four decades, consistent with their designed 15-year useful life, and KIP areas have similar access to public amenities today.

Q: How does the paper calculate surplus and what are the results? A: The surplus framework compares KIP (informal, tends to stay informal) against non-KIP counterfactuals (more likely formal) on three dimensions: non-KIP areas have (i) higher land values, (ii) taller structures, but (iii) lower horizontal built-up coverage than slums (18% vs. 35% for KIP). Consumer surplus uses a linear demand approximation with elasticity of 0.2 for non-KIP and 0.16 for KIP (backed out from differences in housing budget shares). Producer surplus integrates a Cobb-Douglas supply curve with elasticities of 1.4 (formal) and 1.3 (informal). In Q1, KIP property value is $1,873 per square meter vs. $3,098 for non-KIP, a difference of $1,225 in value terms and $2,369 in surplus terms. The surplus gap falls to $1,044 in Q2, and halves again in Q3, becoming positive (+$347 per square meter) in Q5. Ninety percent of total surplus losses are concentrated in Q1 and Q2, which cover 47% of KIP’s area.

Q: What do the case studies of kampung clearances illustrate? A: Three Jakarta kampungs cleared in 2015-2016 are examined. Kampung Bukit Duri (Q5, lowest real estate potential) shows a surplus difference of +$572 per square meter in favor of KIP — meaning clearance there is socially inefficient. Kali Pessangrahan (Q3) shows a surplus difference of -$307. Kalijodo (Q2) shows -$910 per square meter, suggesting sizable societal gains from formalization. However, even in Kalijodo, residents were relocated 24 km away to Marunda (a Q5 area), where consumer surplus is only 46% of Kalijodo’s — illustrating that societal gains from formalization do not automatically translate into Pareto improvements for evicted residents.

Q: What robustness checks address alternative explanations? A: The paper runs several tests. A placebo BDD using 45 non-KIP historical kampung boundaries finds no significant discontinuity, ruling out the hypothesis that slums generically have persistently lower land values. Bandwidth robustness shows consistent BDD estimates from 150 to 500 meters. Tests for spatial spillovers find no spatial decay pattern in land values near KIP boundaries, consistent with the prevalence of gated communities in formal Jakarta minimizing neighborhood contamination. Endogenous sorting is examined using 2010 Census data on 10 million individuals: educational attainment is slightly higher in KIP, and in-migration is slightly lower (1-2 percentage points below mean) with migrants having slightly more years of schooling — both inconsistent with an explanation based on low-skill sorting into KIP. Direct congestion effects from population density are also ruled out by estimating spatial decay around 45 dense non-KIP informal hamlets, finding no decay large enough to explain the land-value effects.

Q: What are the policy implications for slum upgrading in other developing countries? A: The paper’s framework suggests that slum upgrading’s cost-benefit balance depends critically on where the upgraded area sits in the real estate potential distribution. In low-potential areas (bottom quintiles of the land index), upgrading delivers net surplus even decades later and implicitly provides affordable housing at scale to millions of residents. In high-potential areas (top quintiles), the opportunity costs from delayed formalization can be large — up to $2,369 per square meter in surplus terms — and the paper suggests that stronger land market institutions to share surplus with informal residents could partially mitigate these costs. The paper also notes that formalization involves complex institutional and political challenges: relocating millions of kampung residents is logistically difficult, compensation is frequently inadequate or absent, and land assembly faces severe holdout problems.

Dynamic inefficiency in cities: The phenomenon, in the context of this paper, whereby preserving informal slum settlements through upgrading delays their formalization, generating opportunity costs from land misallocation as surrounding formal areas develop. Distinguished from static inefficiency: KIP may raise resident welfare while simultaneously reducing aggregate land productivity.

Slum upgrading: A policy providing basic public goods improvements (roads, sanitation, community buildings) and tenure security (typically verbal non-eviction guarantees) to existing slum residents in situ, without relocating them. Contrasted with formalization (redevelopment) and sites-and-services programs.

Boundary discontinuity design (BDD): The paper’s second identification strategy, comparing outcomes for observations within 200 meters on either side of KIP program boundaries, with boundary fixed effects and quadratic distance controls, under the assumption that absent KIP, unobserved real estate potential varies smoothly at program boundaries.

Predicted land index: A hamlet-level index constructed by regressing non-KIP log land values on hamlet fixed effects across 2,058 Jakarta hamlets, used to proxy real estate market potential and rank neighborhoods into quintiles from highest (Q1) to lowest (Q5) development stage.

Informal surplus: The surplus generated within the informal housing sector, including built-up volume from high horizontal coverage (35% for KIP kampungs) and low-cost informal structures, which is destroyed upon formalization and must be weighed against the gains from taller, higher-value formal developments.

Land fragmentation: The number of distinct land parcels per unit area (pixel), measured from Jakarta’s 2011 cadastral maps. Higher fragmentation exacerbates holdout problems in land assembly, raising the cost of redevelopment and contributing to delayed formalization.

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Structural Change, Land Use and Urban Expansion

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

This paper asks how cities grow in the process of structural transformation — specifically, whether urban expansion occurs at the intensive margin (higher density within a fixed area) or the extensive margin (larger area). The authors document and explain a persistent decline in urban density in France since 1870, and develop a spatial general equilibrium model in which endogenous land use — land allocated either to agriculture or housing — is the key mechanism linking structural change to urban sprawl.

The central empirical fact is striking: between 1870 and 2015, the area of the 100 largest French cities increased by a factor of roughly 30, while their population grew by only a factor of about 4, implying that average urban density fell by a factor of roughly 8. This density decline was fastest over 1950–1975, coinciding with the acceleration of structural change (France’s rural exodus). Since the mid-nineteenth century, approximately 15% of French land has been reallocated away from agricultural use — more than the total artificially-used land in France today (about 9%).

The theoretical mechanism operates through the opportunity cost of urban expansion. Agricultural land at the urban fringe must earn its marginal product in the rural sector; this agricultural rent pins down the cost of converting land to urban use. When agricultural productivity is low, farmland is expensive relative to income (the “food problem”), households devote large shares of resources to food, and cities remain small in area and very dense. As agricultural productivity rises — the engine of structural change — workers leave rural areas, farmland values fall relative to income, and cities can expand cheaply at their fringes. Simultaneously, richer households spend more on housing. Both forces cause urban area to grow faster than urban population, generating a sustained decline in average density.

The model also predicts a “hockey-stick” path for housing prices: during structural change, the extensive margin expansion of cities limits the rise in urban land rents despite growing housing demand. Once the reallocation of workers and land out of agriculture slows, urban land values must adjust upward rapidly, producing the pattern documented by Knoll et al. (2017) — relatively flat housing prices until roughly the 1950s, then steep increases.

The model is a multi-city, multi-sector spatial equilibrium framework with non-homothetic CES preferences (including a subsistence requirement for the agricultural good), endogenous city fringes determined by land market clearing between agricultural and residential uses, and a monocentric commuting structure with endogenous commuting speed (workers adopt faster modes as wages rise). The model is calibrated to French historical data spanning 1840–2015, with 20 regions whose sectoral productivities are estimated to match regional urban populations and local farmland prices.

Quantitatively, the calibrated model accounts for approximately 70% of the increase in urban area since 1870, most of the decline in average urban density (the factor-of-8 fall), about half of the rise in real housing prices, and most of the reallocation of land values from agricultural to urban. Cross-sectional evidence confirms a core prediction: cities surrounded by more expensive farmland are denser, with an IV-estimated elasticity of urban density with respect to farmland prices of approximately 0.3 (a 10% increase in farmland prices raises urban density by about 3%), consistent with the model’s counterpart. Scope conditions include the focus on France as a single country case, reliance on a monocentric urban structure, and the abstraction from within-urban-sector reallocation (manufacturing to services).

Q: What is the central stylized fact motivating the paper? A: Between 1870 and 2015, the area of the 100 largest French cities increased by a factor of roughly 30, while their total population grew by a factor of about 4, so average urban density fell by a factor of roughly 8. This density decline was most rapid over 1950–1975, coinciding with France’s peak rural exodus, and has barely fallen since — tracking the slowdown of structural change. This pattern is not unique to France; Angel et al. (2010) document persistent urban density decline on a global scale.

Q: What is the paper’s key theoretical mechanism linking structural change to urban sprawl? A: The rental price of agricultural land at the urban fringe is the opportunity cost of expanding the city into surrounding farmland. When agricultural productivity is low, farmland is expensive relative to income, keeping cities small and dense. As productivity rises and workers migrate to cities, the value of agricultural land falls relative to income, reducing the cost of urban expansion at the fringe. Richer households also devote a larger share of spending to housing, reinforcing the demand for space. These two channels together cause city area to grow faster than city population, generating a sustained decline in average density — even without any improvement in commuting technology.

Q: How does the paper distinguish between the structural change channel and the commuting cost channel? A: The model contains both channels: structural change (falling agricultural land values at the fringe) and falling effective commuting costs (rising wages lead workers to adopt faster commuting modes, a wage elasticity of commuting speed calibrated from survey data). Counterfactuals show that without structural change (rural productivity growth set to 4% of baseline), the model cannot replicate the observed density decline. Without faster commutes (setting the income elasticity of commuting speed to unity), the model predicts only about 30% of the baseline density decline. Both channels are necessary; their combined effect exceeds the sum of parts because structural change raises wages, which in turn amplifies the commuting speed mechanism.

Q: How do the two channels differ in their spatial imprint within cities? A: Structural change adds new low-density settlements at the urban fringe, so suburban density falls more than average density — the center is relatively less affected. Faster commuting modes, by contrast, induce suburbanization: workers relocate from the center outward, so central density falls more than average density. For Paris, historical data show that central density fell less than average urban density, which is consistent with both mechanisms operating simultaneously — the commuting channel pushing central density down more, but the structural change channel adding fringe expansion that affects suburban density more.

Q: What is the empirical evidence on the cross-sectional farmland price prediction? A: Using data on local farmland transaction prices from the French Ministry of Agriculture at the “Petite Region Agricole” level (over 700 areas), the authors show that cities surrounded by more expensive farmland are denser. A binned scatter plot across 200 French cities shows that moving from the first to last decile of farmland prices raises density by about one third — an effect comparable in magnitude to an increase in population from roughly 25,000 (3rd decile) to 150,000 (9th decile). To address endogeneity (productive cities may inflate nearby farmland prices), the authors instrument farmland prices with soil quality characteristics; the IV elasticity of urban density with respect to farmland prices is approximately 0.3, consistent with the model’s predicted counterpart.

Q: What does the model predict about the time path of housing prices? A: The model predicts a “hockey-stick” pattern: housing prices remain relatively flat for decades while structural change is ongoing, because cities expand cheaply at the extensive margin, absorbing growing housing demand without large rent increases. Once the reallocation of workers and land out of agriculture slows, the extensive margin ceases to buffer demand, and urban land values must rise sharply. The calibrated model accounts for about half of the observed rise in real housing prices since the mid-nineteenth century; it matches the qualitative hockey-stick pattern documented by Knoll et al. (2017) and Piketty and Zucman (2014) for France and advanced economies more broadly.

Q: What happens to the relative values of agricultural versus urban land over the period? A: Agricultural land values relative to income fall dramatically: the average value of a French agricultural field per unit of land, as a share of per capita income, was divided by a factor of 15 between 1850 and 2015. Meanwhile, urban land values rise. In 1820, agricultural land accounted for more than 70% of total housing and land wealth in France; by 2010 this share had fallen to about 3%. This reallocation of land values from rural to urban is a central prediction the model accounts for, driven by structural change reducing the scarcity premium on farmland.

Q: How is the model parameterized and calibrated? A: Preferences are non-homothetic CES with housing preference parameter gamma = 0.22, subsistence consumption for the rural good calibrated to match the 1840 agricultural employment share (about 60%), and substitution elasticity between urban and rural goods sigma = 0.8. The labor share in agriculture is alpha = 0.6. Commuting cost parameters (elasticities to wages and distance) are estimated from the French Labor Force Survey (Enquete Emploi). Region-specific sectoral productivity parameters for 20 regions (40 parameters total) are estimated to match the cross-section of urban populations and local farmland values in the base year 1870. The model is then simulated forward to 2015.

Q: What share of French land has been reallocated away from agriculture, and how does this relate to urban expansion? A: About two-thirds of French land was used for agriculture in 1840; by 2015 this fell to 52%, implying roughly 15 percentage points of French territory reallocated away from agricultural use. This 15% exceeds the total land currently under artificial use in France (about 9%). Over the more precisely measured period 1982–2015, artificialized soil increased by about 2 million hectares (3.7% of French territory), representing roughly 70% of the land converted away from agriculture over the same period. Two-thirds of land surrounding French cities is agricultural, confirming that urban expansion occurs at the expense of farmland.

Q: What are the limitations and directions for future research acknowledged by the authors? A: The model relies on a monocentric urban structure where all workers commute to a single city center, which is an approximation — commuting distance increases with residential distance to the center but less than one-for-one, suggesting workers sort into nearby jobs. The model also abstracts from within-urban-sector reallocation (the manufacturing-to-services transition), which the authors conjecture matters for the cross-section of cities in recent times. Finally, the model cannot fully replicate the steep recent rise in housing prices, which the authors attribute partly to land-use regulations constraining extensive margin growth — a policy counterfactual the general equilibrium structure is well-suited to analyze.

Q: How does the paper relate to the Ricardo/Nichols view that land values should rise with economic development? A: The traditional Ricardian view predicts that a fixed factor like land must rise in value with economic development — counterfactual given the historical data showing farmland values falling sharply relative to income. The authors reconcile this with the data by emphasizing that structural change and agricultural productivity growth reduce the scarcity of farmland even as total income grows, so farmland values fall. Urban land values do rise, but the structural change channel initially dampens this increase by facilitating extensive-margin city growth. The paper thus reconciles the Ricardian fixed-factor view with the commuting technology view (Miles and Sefton, 2020) within a unified spatial structural change framework.

Endogenous land use: In this paper’s framework, land in each region is allocated either to agricultural production or to residential use, with the margin between the two determined in equilibrium by the equality of the rental price of land at the urban fringe and the marginal product of land in the rural sector. This makes the urban-rural land boundary an endogenous object that responds to structural change.

Urban fringe (phi_k): The furthest residential location of an urban worker in city k, determined endogenously as the commuting distance at which the opportunity cost of further expansion (the agricultural land rent) equals the willingness of urban workers to pay for land. All workers beyond this fringe produce rural goods without commuting.

Structural change (in the paper’s sense): The reallocation of workers and land away from agriculture driven jointly by non-homothetic preferences with a subsistence consumption requirement for the agricultural good (demand side) and rising sectoral productivity (supply side). Structural change is the primary driver of falling farmland values and urban sprawl in the model.

Non-homothetic CES preferences: Household preferences over rural and urban goods that are not homogeneous of degree one in income, specified as a CES aggregate with a subsistence floor for the rural (agricultural) good. At low income levels, households devote large budget shares to food; as income rises, spending shifts toward urban goods and housing. This demand-side non-homotheticity is the channel through which rising income generates structural change.

Food problem (Schultz, 1953): The condition in which low agricultural productivity forces households to devote a large fraction of resources to meeting subsistence food needs, leaving little for housing expenditure. In the paper’s model, the food problem makes cities initially small and very dense; as agricultural productivity rises and the food problem relaxes, cities can expand in area.

Commuting cost function tau(l_k): Spatial frictions proportional to the worker’s distance from the city center and the urban wage, of the functional form tau(l_k) = a * w_{u,k}^{xi_w} * l_k^{xi_l}, where xi_w in (0,1) captures the endogenous adoption of faster commuting modes as wages rise. Concavity in both arguments is micro-founded by an optimizing commuting mode choice model, ensuring that the share of resources devoted to commuting falls as incomes rise.

Hockey-stick housing price path: The model’s prediction that real housing prices remain relatively flat over the period of active structural change — because city expansion at the extensive margin absorbs rising housing demand without large rent increases — before rising steeply once structural change slows and the extensive margin is exhausted. This prediction matches the empirical pattern documented by Knoll et al. (2017) for France and other advanced economies.