This paper studies imperfect competition in selection markets where competing firms have heterogeneous information about consumers — a layer of asymmetry distinct from the classic buyer-seller …
Online FirstReview of Economic StudiesOnline 18 Jun 2026
Hwang, Kim, and Boleslavsky study how firms in an oligopoly simultaneously choose prices and advertising strategies, where advertising is modeled as the choice of how much product information to …
PublishedReview of Economic StudiesOnline 11 Nov 2025Published Sep 2026
This paper investigates how buyer demand for supplier diversification shapes entry incentives and market structure, using the global undersea fiber-optic cable industry as the empirical setting. The …
Online FirstJournal of Political EconomyOnline 4 Sep 2026
Covert and Kellogg study policies that aim to "keep carbon in the ground" by blocking fossil fuel infrastructure investment, with the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) as their empirical application. DAPL …
Online FirstReview of Economic StudiesOnline 17 Jun 2026
This paper asks what market outcomes an information designer — modeled as an internet platform that knows consumers' preferences — can achieve by choosing what information to disclose to competing …
PublishedAmerican Economic ReviewPublished Aug 2026
This paper by Bhattacharya, Illanes, and Stillerman makes two contributions to the debate over US antitrust enforcement stringency. First, it documents the price, quantity, and assortment effects of a …
Online FirstJournal of Political EconomyOnline 15 Jun 2026
Acemoglu, Huttenlocher, Ozdaglar, and Siderius develop a two-sided platform model to study the welfare consequences of digital advertising as an online business model. The platform intermediates …
Online FirstReview of Economic StudiesOnline 15 Jun 2026
This paper develops a general nonparametric model of discrete choice in which peers influence agents through two distinct channels: (1) the set of alternatives an agent considers (consideration set …
PublishedReview of Economic StudiesOnline 17 Jan 2026Published Sep 2026
Donna and Espín-Sánchez investigate whether a market (sequential English auction) or a non-market institution (fixed quota) more efficiently allocates an intermediate good — irrigation water — when …