L13

Marco Cosconati · Yi Xin · Fan Wu · Yizhou Jin

This paper studies imperfect competition in selection markets where competing firms have heterogeneous information about consumers — a layer of asymmetry distinct from the classic buyer-seller …

Ilwoo Hwang · Kyungmin Kim · Raphael Boleslavsky

Hwang, Kim, and Boleslavsky study how firms in an oligopoly simultaneously choose prices and advertising strategies, where advertising is modeled as the choice of how much product information to …

El Hadi Caoui · Andrew Steck

This paper investigates how buyer demand for supplier diversification shapes entry incentives and market structure, using the global undersea fiber-optic cable industry as the empirical setting. The …

Thomas R Covert · Ryan Kellogg

Covert and Kellogg study policies that aim to "keep carbon in the ground" by blocking fossil fuel infrastructure investment, with the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) as their empirical application. DAPL …

Matthew Elliott · Andrea Galeotti · Andrew Koh · Wenhao Li

This paper asks what market outcomes an information designer — modeled as an internet platform that knows consumers' preferences — can achieve by choosing what information to disclose to competing …

Vivek Bhattacharya · Gastón Illanes · David Stillerman

This paper by Bhattacharya, Illanes, and Stillerman makes two contributions to the debate over US antitrust enforcement stringency. First, it documents the price, quantity, and assortment effects of a …

Daron Acemoglu · Daniel Huttenlocher · Asuman Ozdaglar · James Siderius

Acemoglu, Huttenlocher, Ozdaglar, and Siderius develop a two-sided platform model to study the welfare consequences of digital advertising as an online business model. The platform intermediates …

Nail Kashaev · Natalia Lazzati · Ruli Xiao

This paper develops a general nonparametric model of discrete choice in which peers influence agents through two distinct channels: (1) the set of alternatives an agent considers (consideration set …

Javier D Donna · José-Antonio Espín-Sánchez

Donna and Espín-Sánchez investigate whether a market (sequential English auction) or a non-market institution (fixed quota) more efficiently allocates an intermediate good — irrigation water — when …