J23 | Macro Paper Warehouse

Automation and Rent Dissipation

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Acemoglu and Restrepo examine the effects of automation in economies where labor market distortions cause some workers to earn rents—wages above their opportunity cost or outside option. The central question is how the interplay between automation and these distortions shapes wages, inequality, and productivity. The paper makes three contributions: a theoretical framework identifying a rent dissipation mechanism, reduced-form empirical evidence using US data from 1980 to 2016, and a general equilibrium quantification of automation’s aggregate effects.

The theoretical framework extends the task model of Acemoglu and Restrepo (2022) to incorporate task-specific wage wedges. In this setup, a firm employing labor of type g in task x pays a wage equal to the base wage multiplied by an exogenous wedge capturing rents from efficiency wages, bargaining, licensing, regulations, or norms. Because these wedges artificially inflate labor costs in high-rent tasks, firms have a stronger incentive to automate precisely those tasks—automation saves more in labor costs where rents are highest. Proposition 3 establishes that endogenous adoption decisions are tilted toward high-rent tasks: the rent distribution in automated tasks first-order stochastically dominates the rent distribution across all tasks. This targeting generates the rent dissipation mechanism. The equilibrium is inefficient on both the intensive margin (too little employment in high-rent tasks) and the extensive margin (excessive automation of high-rent tasks that a social planner would prefer to keep labor-intensive).

The rent dissipation mechanism has three consequences identified theoretically. First, it amplifies average wage losses for exposed groups beyond what displacement alone would produce, pushing displaced workers toward lower-paying jobs. Second, it compresses within-group wage dispersion by concentrating losses at higher percentiles of the within-group distribution, generating a U-shaped pattern of wage changes: workers at low percentiles earn no rents and experience only base-wage adjustments, while workers between the 70th and 95th percentiles face the steepest declines due to loss of high-rent jobs. Third, it is inefficient: because the tasks targeted by automation are not those where wages reflect scarcity or skill but rather distortionary rents, a planner would have preferred more labor allocated to these tasks, and rent dissipation offsets part or all of the cost-saving productivity gains from automation.

The empirical analysis covers 500 detailed demographic groups defined by education (five levels), gender, five age groups, five race/ethnicity groups, and nativity. Task displacement is measured as a weighted sum of industry-level automation exposure using three proxies: adjusted industrial robot penetration, specialized software services, and dedicated machinery in value added. Workers in the middle and lower-middle of the wage distribution lost 15–20% of their tasks to automation between 1980 and 2016, while post-college workers saw few tasks automated.

A 10 percentage point increase in task displacement is associated with a 24% decline in group-level relative wages (β = −2.36, s.e. = 0.13), falling to 19% after controlling for gender, education, sectoral demand, and rent shifters (β = −1.90, s.e. = 0.29). The U-shaped pattern in within-group wage changes is clearly visible: wages decline by 25–30% per 10 percentage point task displacement at the 70th–90th percentiles, compared to only 16% at the 5th–40th percentiles. Decomposing the average wage effect, the base-wage component is β = −1.53 (s.e. = 0.33) and the rent-dissipation component is β = −0.37 (s.e. = 0.11), implying a rent dissipation rate of approximately 37%. Across multiple proxies for rents—inter-industry/occupation wage differentials, wage losses after job displacement, and quit rates—the average estimated rent dissipation rate is approximately 35%. Rent dissipation accounts for one-fifth of the overall relative wage decline experienced by groups exposed to automation.

In the general equilibrium quantification (with elasticity of substitution λ = 0.5, average cost savings π = 30%, and average rent in automated tasks of 35%), automation accounts for 52% of the rise in between-group wage inequality since 1980: 42 percentage points via baseline displacement effects on labor demand, and 10 percentage points via rent dissipation. Cost savings from automation increased TFP by approximately 3% between 1980 and 2016, but inefficient rent dissipation offsets 60–90% of these gains, leaving net TFP gains of only 0.3–1.3% and net aggregate consumption gains of only 0.45–1.95% over the 36-year period.

Q: What is the rent dissipation mechanism, and why does it arise? A: Rent dissipation arises because labor market wedges make high-rent tasks artificially costly to staff with workers, giving firms a stronger incentive to automate precisely those tasks. When automation displaces workers from high-rent jobs, workers lose the premium above their opportunity cost that those jobs paid, amplifying wage losses beyond what displacement alone would cause. The mechanism is endogenous: firms do not randomly automate tasks but disproportionately target tasks where rents are highest, since doing so saves the most in labor costs. Proposition 3 formalizes this as first-order stochastic dominance of the rent distribution in automated tasks over the rent distribution in all tasks.

Q: Why is rent dissipation inefficient? A: In a distorted economy, high-rent tasks already feature too little employment at the equilibrium—firms under-hire in these tasks because the wage wedge makes labor artificially expensive. A social planner would want to allocate more labor to these tasks, not less. When automation further removes labor from high-rent tasks, it moves the economy further from the efficient allocation, dissipating rents that reflect distortions rather than true scarcity. The TFP formula shows that this inefficient targeting offsets part or all of the cost-saving gains from automation, and can even reduce aggregate productivity if the cost savings are small relative to the rent losses.

Q: What is the U-shaped pattern of within-group wage changes, and what does it indicate? A: The U-shaped pattern means that wage declines due to automation are smallest at the bottom percentiles of a group’s within-group wage distribution, largest in the 70th–95th percentile range, and then smaller again at the very top. Workers at low percentiles earn no rents, so they experience only the base-wage adjustment from reduced labor demand. Workers in the middle-upper range of the distribution hold the high-rent jobs that are disproportionately automated, so they lose both the base-wage component and the rent component of their wages. This pattern is directly visible in US data 1980–2016, with declines of 25–30% per 10 percentage point task displacement at the 70th–90th percentiles versus 16% at the 5th–40th percentiles.

Q: How is task displacement measured, and which groups are most exposed? A: Task displacement is measured as a weighted sum of industry-level automation exposure, accounting for each demographic group’s specialization in routine tasks within industries. Three proxies are used: the adjusted penetration of industrial robots, the increase in specialized software services, and the increase in dedicated machinery in value added. Workers in the middle and lower-middle of the wage distribution—broadly corresponding to non-college workers—lost 15–20% of their tasks to automation between 1980 and 2016. Post-college degree workers saw few tasks automated.

Q: How large is the rent dissipation rate, and how robust is this estimate? A: The baseline estimate from the U-shaped within-group wage change decomposition implies a rent dissipation rate (μ_Ag/μ_g − 1) of approximately 37% (β = −0.37, s.e. = 0.11). Using inter-industry and occupation wage differentials as a proxy for rents, the estimate is 39% (β = −0.39, s.e. = 0.11). Using wage losses after job displacement, the estimate is 20% (β = −0.20, s.e. = 0.04). After purging compensating differentials from the wage differential proxy the estimate remains 37%; after purging from the displacement-loss proxy it falls to 19%. Quit-rate evidence is consistent with rent dissipation: automation shifts workers toward higher-quit-rate jobs, which are lower-rent jobs. The average across proxies is approximately 35%.

Q: How much of between-group wage inequality since 1980 does automation explain, and what share is due to rent dissipation specifically? A: Automation accounts for 52% of the rise in between-group wage inequality in the US since 1980. Of this 52 percentage points, 42 percentage points are attributable to the baseline displacement effect working through reduced labor demand for exposed groups. The remaining 10 percentage points are attributable to rent dissipation—automation pushing exposed groups away from high-rent tasks into lower-paying employment. Rent dissipation thus accounts for roughly one-fifth (10/52) of automation’s total contribution to between-group inequality.

Q: How large are the productivity gains from automation, and how much does rent dissipation offset them? A: Cost savings from automation increased TFP by approximately 3% between 1980 and 2016. However, inefficient rent dissipation offsets 60–90% of these gains, because automation disproportionately targets high-rent tasks rather than tasks where the efficiency case is strongest. The net TFP increase attributable to automation is only 0.3–1.3% over the 36-year period, and the corresponding net increase in aggregate consumption is only 0.45–1.95%.

Q: How does automation affect within-group versus between-group inequality, and why is this notable? A: Automation increases between-group inequality by reducing relative wages of exposed groups (largely non-college workers) relative to unexposed groups, accounting for 52% of the rise in between-group inequality since 1980. At the same time, automation reduces within-group wage dispersion for exposed groups by compressing wages at higher percentiles. This contrasts with the standard view that inequality is fractal—rising at all levels of aggregation due to skill-biased demand—and helps explain why within-group inequality has risen steadily for college workers since the 1980s while remaining flat and then declining for non-college workers since the 1990s.

Q: What do the propagation matrix and rent-impact matrix represent in the general equilibrium analysis? A: The propagation matrix encodes how task reallocation due to automation in one demographic group creates competition for marginal tasks across other groups, transmitting the wage effects of automation to groups not directly displaced. The rent-impact matrix encodes how this task reallocation changes the rent composition of employment across groups. Both matrices are estimated from US data on task shares and group-level wage elasticities and are used to translate partial-equilibrium estimates of task displacement and rent dissipation into general equilibrium effects on wages and productivity for all demographic groups simultaneously.

Q: What are the policy implications of inefficient rent dissipation? A: Because rent dissipation is inefficient, the social value of automation is lower than what firms and consumers are willing to pay—firms capture all the labor cost savings but do not internalize the welfare cost of destroying high-rent jobs that the distorted equilibrium already under-supplies. Second-best interventions should address the underlying distortions generating rents rather than trying to slow automation directly. The paper suggests that strengthening labor market institutions supporting worker rents in non-automatable tasks could partially counteract the adverse distributional consequences of automation.

Q: How does this paper relate to Bound and Johnson (1992) and Borjas and Ramey (1995)? A: Bound and Johnson (1992) decompose changes in the US wage structure between 1979 and 1988 into technology, supply, and rent components (modeled as exogenous industry wedges), finding that 10–20% of between-group wage changes reflect rent losses. Borjas and Ramey (1995) estimate that trade increased the college premium by 1.3–2.6 log points between 1976 and 1990, with 15–33% due to loss of rents from trade-exposed jobs. Both are comparable to this paper’s finding that rent dissipation accounts for one-fifth of the wage effect of automation, though Bound and Johnson’s estimates include all factors affecting rents while this paper isolates automation specifically.

Worker rents: Wages above a worker’s opportunity cost or outside option, arising from efficiency wages, bargaining, licensing, regulations, or norms. Modeled as task-specific multiplicative wedges (μ_gx ≥ 1) that force firms to pay more than the base wage for labor in particular tasks. Explicitly excludes compensating differentials and skill premia.

Rent dissipation: The loss of above-opportunity-cost wages experienced by workers displaced from high-rent tasks into lower-paying employment. Occurs because automation endogenously targets high-rent tasks where labor is most expensive, and pushes workers into tasks where rents are lower. Quantified as the ratio of average rents in automated tasks to average rents across all tasks, minus one (approximately 35% in US data 1980–2016).

Task displacement: The share of tasks performed by a demographic group that are automated away, measured as a weighted sum of industry-level automation exposure accounting for the group’s specialization in routine tasks. Distinct from employment loss because it captures reallocation of tasks from labor to capital within the production function.

U-shaped within-group wage change profile: The pattern whereby automation generates the largest wage declines at intermediate-to-upper percentiles (70th–95th) of an exposed group’s within-group wage distribution, with smaller declines at the bottom, because high-percentile workers disproportionately hold high-rent jobs targeted by automation. Predicted theoretically and confirmed empirically in US data 1980–2016.

Propagation matrix: A matrix estimated from US data on task shares and group-level wage elasticities that encodes how automation of tasks performed by one demographic group creates competition for marginal tasks with other groups, transmitting wage effects across the demographic distribution in general equilibrium.

Inefficient automation targeting: The mechanism by which labor market distortions cause firms to automate high-rent tasks that a social planner would prefer to keep labor-intensive, since the distorted equilibrium already features too little employment in those tasks. Results in rent dissipation offsetting 60–90% of automation’s direct TFP gains from cost savings.

Rent-impact matrix: A matrix that encodes how task reallocation due to automation changes the rent composition of employment across demographic groups, used alongside the propagation matrix to compute general equilibrium effects of automation on wages and productivity accounting for distortions.

Downward Rigidity in the Wage for New Hires

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Layer 1 — Summary

Hazell and Taska use wages posted on online job vacancies — matched to job titles and establishment identifiers from Burning Glass Technologies — to measure the wage for new hires at the job level (same job title and establishment) over 2010Q1–2020Q2. They find that this measure of the wage for new hires is rigid downward and flexible upward. At the job level, the nominal posted wage changes infrequently — on average once every 5–6 quarters — and conditional on changing, is four times more likely to rise than to fall. In the cyclical dimension, job-level posted wages rise strongly when state unemployment falls but do not fall when state unemployment rises; real wages exhibit the same asymmetric pattern. These results do not appear in the average wage for new hires (which aggregates across all job types), because time-varying job composition inflates the variance of average wages and raises standard errors roughly twentyfold relative to job-level regressions — explaining why prior work using worker-level survey data found no evidence of downward rigidity. A Heckman (1979) selection correction for firms’ selection into vacancy posting suggests that selection bias in the job-level regression is moderate. The findings provide direct empirical support for models in which downward wage rigidity for new hires — specifically at the job level — amplifies unemployment fluctuations and generates asymmetric unemployment dynamics.

In depth

Q1. Q: What is the central empirical claim of the paper?

A: At the job level — defined as the same job title within the same establishment — the wage posted for new hires is rigid downward and flexible upward. It changes infrequently and, conditional on changing, rises far more often than it falls; and it responds to falls in unemployment but not to rises in unemployment.

Q2. Q: What data does the paper use, and what defines a “job”?

A: The paper uses the Burning Glass Technologies dataset of wages posted on online vacancies, covering January 2010 to June 2020. A “job” is a job title within an establishment whose wages are paid at a given frequency (e.g., hourly or annual). The data come from the near-universe of online job postings — roughly 40,000 sources — and the main regression sample consists of jobs that post wages, have job title and establishment information, and post vacancies in multiple quarters, yielding approximately 3.05 million vacancies, representing about 0.8% of total US vacancies.

Q3. Q: How do the authors validate that posted wages measure the wage for new hires?

A: They construct a measure of the wage for new hires from the Current Population Survey (CPS) — workers switching jobs or entering from unemployment — at the state, industry, and occupation level. Regressing log CPS wages on log Burning Glass wages (using an IV split-sample procedure to correct for attenuation bias) yields a coefficient close to 1 across specifications and levels of aggregation, indicating that average posted wages move roughly one-for-one with average wages for new hires in representative survey data.

Q4. Q: How is the frequency of wage change estimated?

A: Because wages are not observed in quarters without a vacancy posting, the authors adapt a constant-hazard model from the price-setting literature (following Nakamura–Steinsson and Klenow–Kryvtsov). The latent wage evolves stochastically between postings; the observed wage is treated as a draw from this process. The quarterly probability of wage change is estimated at 0.17–0.19 across specifications, implying implied durations of unchanged wages of 4–5 quarters.

Q5. Q: What is the asymmetry in the direction of wage changes?

A: In the unweighted baseline, the quarterly probability of a wage decrease is 0.04, whereas the probability of a wage increase is 0.12 — roughly a three-to-one ratio in probabilities, summarized in the paper’s abstract as wages being “four times more likely to rise than to fall.” The distribution of non-zero wage changes also shows a pronounced pile-up of small positive changes relative to small negative changes, consistent with a downward constraint on wage setting.

Q6. Q: What is the first piece of cyclical evidence for downward rigidity?

A: A binned scatterplot (Figure 1) of job-level wage growth against state-level quarterly changes in unemployment shows a strong, roughly linear relationship when unemployment is falling — wages rise with falls in unemployment, both for small and large declines. When unemployment rises, however, wages do not fall — neither for small nor for large increases in unemployment. This asymmetry is robust to regression-based analysis and to identified labor demand shocks.

Q7. Q: Are real wages also rigid downward?

A: Yes. The paper reports that real wages (nominal posted wages deflated) are also rigid downward and flexible upward, mirroring the pattern for nominal wages.

Q8. Q: What is the job-composition problem, and why does it matter?

A: The average wage for new hires — the object measured in most prior work — aggregates across all job types that are actively hiring. If the composition of jobs hiring shifts over the business cycle (e.g., the share of lower-wage jobs rises in recessions), then average wages can fall even if no individual job cuts its wage, and can stay flat or rise even if every job cuts its wage. Job composition therefore confounds cyclicality estimates based on average wages. By tracking the same job title at the same establishment across successive vacancies, the authors purge wage changes driven by shifting composition.

Q9. Q: Why did prior work find no evidence of downward rigidity for new hires?

A: Prior work used worker-level survey data (e.g., Bils 1985; Pissarides 2009 survey) that controls for worker characteristics but averages across jobs — the average wage for new hires. The volatility of job composition inflates the variance of this average measure. In the Burning Glass data, standard errors from regressions using average wages are roughly twenty times larger than those from job-level regressions, making it impossible to detect downward rigidity even if it exists. Point estimates in prior work suggested procyclicality but were too imprecise to exclude downward rigidity.

Q10. Q: How does this paper relate to Gertler, Huckfeldt, and Trigari (2020) and Grigsby, Hurst, and Yildirmaz (2021)?

A: Both papers attempt to control for job composition at the worker level. Gertler et al. focus on wages of workers hired from unemployment (less affected by composition than all new hires) and find weakly procyclical wages. Grigsby et al. use rich payroll data and worker-level matching to control for composition and also find weakly procyclical wages. The present paper complements these by using job-level data that directly purges composition without relying on worker characteristics, and adds evidence on the asymmetry of rigidity (not just average procyclicality).

Q11. Q: What is the role of the Heckman selection correction?

A: If firms select into vacancy posting depending on business-cycle conditions, the sample of observed posted wages may be non-random, biasing job-level wage-cyclicality estimates. The authors implement a standard Heckman (1979) two-step selection correction. The correction suggests that selection bias in the job-level regression is moderate — it does not overturn the finding of downward rigidity.

Q12. Q: What are the four main caveats the authors acknowledge?

A: (1) The main sample is small — 0.8% of US vacancies — though the authors show it is broadly representative on observables and that wages track representative survey data. (2) The paper measures rigidity only for jobs that post wages; jobs that do not post wages might be more flexible, though the share of vacancies posting wages does not decline during contractions. (3) Posted wages may differ from realized (bargained) wages; however, wages are rigid even in occupations where bargaining is uncommon. (4) The Pandemic Recession is the main contractionary episode in the sample, and it involved labor supply shocks as well as demand shocks; the authors address this through identified labor demand shock regressions and by ending the sample in June 2020.

Q13. Q: What are the implications for models of unemployment fluctuations?

A: In the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides search model, Pissarides (2009) emphasizes that the wage for newly hired workers — not continuing workers — is the relevant margin for unemployment fluctuations. Shimer (2005) showed the standard calibration produces too-small unemployment fluctuations; wage rigidity for new hires can resolve this. The paper’s finding of downward-but-not-upward rigidity additionally supports models (e.g., Dupraz, Nakamura, and Steinsson, 2020) in which this asymmetry generates asymmetric unemployment dynamics — unemployment rises sharply in contractions but falls more slowly in expansions.

Q14. Q: How do wages for new hires compare with wages for continuing workers in terms of rigidity?

A: The paper finds approximate parity. The implied duration of unchanged wages from the job-level posted wage data (4–5 quarters) is similar to estimates for continuing workers in the prior literature. This is perhaps surprising because wages could in principle be more flexible for new hires than continuing workers — firms might cut wages for new hires even while insuring continuing workers (Beaudry and DiNardo, 1991). The results instead suggest that internal equity concerns (Bewley, 2002) or other forces produce similar rigidity for both groups.

Key Concepts

Job level wage: The wage across successive vacancies posted by the same job title at the same establishment. This is the unit of observation in the paper’s main analysis and the object for which downward rigidity is documented. Distinct from the average wage for new hires (which aggregates across all job types).

Downward rigidity (as used in this paper): An empirical pattern in which wages at the job level do not fall during contractions — they do not respond to rising unemployment — while rising during expansions in response to falling unemployment. The claim is descriptive: the data show wages do not fall; the paper does not structurally identify the mechanism enforcing this floor.

Job composition problem: The bias introduced when measuring cyclicality of the average wage for new hires using data that aggregates across different types of jobs. If the mix of job types hiring shifts with the business cycle, average wages can change even when no individual job changes its wage, and can mask individual-job wage changes. Job-level data resolve this by holding the job fixed.

Burning Glass Technologies dataset: A database of wages posted on online job vacancies, drawn from approximately 40,000 online sources (job boards and company websites), covering the near-universe of US online vacancies. The paper’s main regression sample uses the subset with posted wages, job title, establishment identifiers, and multiple quarters of postings, spanning January 2010 to June 2020.

Constant hazard model (wage change frequency): An estimation procedure adapted from the price-setting literature to recover the quarterly probability of wage change from a dataset in which wages are only observed when a vacancy is posted. The latent wage evolves with a constant hazard of change between observations; observed wage changes identify the hazard rates for increases and decreases separately.

Average wage for new hires: The mean wage across all workers newly entering employment (or across all new-hire jobs), used in prior work (Bils 1985 and related). Does not control for job composition. Shown in this paper to exhibit no detectable downward rigidity, with standard errors roughly twenty times larger than in job-level specifications — because job composition variance inflates the residual variance.

Heckman selection correction: A two-step procedure (Heckman 1979) to correct for the possibility that firms that post vacancies — and post wages — are a selected sample that differs systematically across the business cycle. The paper applies this to assess whether selection into vacancy posting biases the job-level wage-cyclicality estimates; the correction suggests bias is moderate.

Summary based on LSE Research Online accepted version (accepted manuscript, covers full paper including introduction, data, and Section 3; extraction terminated at line 595 before Sections 4–5). AI-assisted, human review pending.

International Trade Responses to Labor Market Regulations

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Overview

Research Question. This paper asks whether differences in labor market regulations — specifically payroll taxes and minimum wages — shape countries’ comparative advantage in the cross-border provision of labor-intensive services. The question has broad policy relevance: if lower labor standards confer a systematic trade advantage, countries may face pressure to race to the bottom in labor protections, and political support for economic integration may erode.

Setting and Identification. The paper exploits the EU “posting policy,” a large trade program established in 1959 that allows firms in one EU member state to temporarily send their employees to perform service contracts in another member state. In 2017, posting accounted for roughly one-third of all within-EU trade in services (approximately 2% of EU GDP), involving about 2 million workers (in full-time equivalents) in 2019. The setting is analytically attractive because competing foreign and domestic firms serve the same customers at the same physical location using shared capital, holding most determinants of comparative advantage constant while labor market regulations vary by the firm’s country of origin.

Under posting rules, payroll taxes are generally origin-based (exporting firms pay their home country’s tax rate) but become destination-based when contracts exceed a regulatory duration threshold (12 months pre-2010, 24 months from 2010–2020, 18 months from 2020 onward). Minimum wages are destination-based: foreign firms must match the importing country’s statutory minimum wage floor when it exceeds the workers’ home-country wage level. This generates the paper’s key identifying variation — payroll taxes and minimum wages vary across countries, over time, and within countries across sectors.

Data. The author uses administrative A1 social security forms filed for every EU posting contract from 2007–2018, collected from 25 EU member states, supplemented by micro-level national posting registries in Belgium (LIMOSA), France (SIPSI), and Luxembourg (matched employer-employee data). Labor cost data (wages, payroll tax rates, minimum wages) come from Eurostat and the OECD Taxing Wages Dataset.

Methodology. The paper proceeds in three steps. First, it documents steady-state cross-sectional correlations between bilateral posting flows and labor cost differentials. Second, it estimates difference-in-differences (DiD) elasticities from four quasi-natural experiments. Third, it estimates a theory-consistent gravity model using all sources of variation across 25 EU countries from 2009–2018.

Main Findings.

Steady-state correlation: A strong negative relationship exists between bilateral posting flows and labor cost differentials, with a cross-sectional elasticity of approximately –0.58 (SE 0.08). In sharp contrast, the relationship between bilateral goods trade and labor cost differentials is weak and if anything marginally positive (point estimate +0.13), confirming that labor cost differences are a distinctive driver of trade specifically in labor-intensive services rather than goods.
Belgian tax shift (2016–2018): When Belgium cut employers’ social security contributions from 33% to 25%, imports of posting services into Belgium slowed relative to France (a neighboring control country on parallel pre-reform trends). The reduced-form elasticity of posting imports with respect to the payroll tax rate is 1.45 (SE 0.3).
Luxembourg EU regulation reform (2010): A new EU regulation required temporary employment agencies in border regions to pay destination-based payroll taxes, raising statutory rates faced by Luxembourgish exporters from 15% to 44%. Posting exports from Luxembourg’s temporary employment sector fell by 40% relative to the pre-reform level and relative to the domestic (control) sector, while the sheltered road transportation sector showed no response. The reduced-form elasticity with respect to the statutory payroll tax rate is –1.55 (SE 0.24), and the triple-difference estimate is –1.37 (SE 0.08).
Bunching at duration thresholds: The distribution of posting contract lengths in France (which has the EU’s highest payroll taxes) shows a sharp spike just below the 24-month payroll tax threshold. When the threshold was moved to 18 months in 2020, excess mass migrated to the new threshold, confirming that bunching reflects behavioral responses to the tax notch rather than reference-point effects. This documents that payroll tax differentials shape not only the quantity (extensive margin) but also the length (intensive margin) of posting contracts.
German minimum wage reform (2015): Germany’s introduction of a national minimum wage of €8.50 per hour — which was already binding on construction workers through a sectoral minimum, but not on foreign firms providing non-construction services — caused postings to Germany in manufacturing to fall by approximately 60% relative to the construction (control) sector. The reduced-form elasticity is –1.34 (SE 0.43). Heterogeneity analysis shows that export declines were monotonically larger for low-wage origin countries where the new minimum wage was binding, and placebo estimates using Germany’s high-wage neighboring countries (where minimum wage requirements did not change) are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
Gravity estimates: The preferred specification (PPML with origin-year, destination-year, and pair fixed effects, exploiting bilateral variation in minimum wage bindingness across origin countries) yields a model-implied trade elasticity θ of –1.2 (SE 0.2). The range across specifications is –1.2 to –2.4. These estimates are smaller than the goods trade elasticity (typically estimated around 5) and below the medium-run reduced-form elasticities from the DiD case studies, consistent with short-run gravity estimates capturing only partial adjustment while DiD designs measure longer-run equilibrium responses.

Policy Counterfactual. The paper’s estimates imply that the Bolkestein Directive — which proposed exempting foreign firms from all destination-country labor regulations — would have doubled exports of physical services from Eastern European countries (upper bound), as their cost advantage would have been dramatically amplified by removal of minimum wage requirements. Counterpart to this export boom, average posted workers’ wages would have fallen by approximately 16%, since workers would lose their entitlement to destination-country minimum wages. The paper documents that the Bolkestein controversy — sparked by the “Polish plumber” debate in early 2005 — coincided with a sharp and persistent drop in French voter support for the EU constitutional treaty, which was subsequently rejected.

Scope Conditions. Results apply specifically to trade in physical (labor-intensive) services traded via temporary worker posting within the EU, where productivity differences across countries for these tasks are plausibly small (Balassa-Samuelson), making institutional factors a primary driver of wage differences. The paper estimates intent-to-treat effects, assuming perfect compliance by exporting firms. The paper does not perform a comprehensive welfare analysis covering consumer price effects or general equilibrium wage and trade-balance responses.

In depth

Q1. What is the EU posting policy and why does it provide an unusually clean setting for identifying the causal effect of labor regulations on trade?

The EU posting policy, established in 1959, allows firms in one EU member state to temporarily send employees to perform service contracts in another member state. The policy keeps most determinants of comparative advantage constant — competing foreign and domestic firms serve the same customers at the same physical location using shared capital — while labor market regulations vary by the firm’s country of origin. Productivity differences for physical services across countries are also plausibly limited (Balassa-Samuelson), making institutional wage differences the primary cost driver. Enforcement is facilitated by the on-site nature of the service, and administrative A1 forms create a direct measure of the number of workers involved in cross-border transactions without a minimum reporting threshold.

Q2. What are the three sources of labor cost differences the paper identifies and quantifies?

Foreign firms competing for posting contracts face different costs through three channels: (i) equilibrium gross wages differ across origin countries, reflecting both productivity differences and institutional/information frictions that allow wage discrimination between posted and domestic workers; (ii) payroll tax rates are origin-based and differ substantially across countries (for example, France’s employer payroll tax is approximately 40% versus approximately 15% for Luxembourg before the 2010 reform); and (iii) destination-specific minimum wages impose a “posting allowance” on firms from countries with lower wages, equal to the shortfall between the firm’s home-country wage and the importing country’s minimum wage floor. Micro-level wage data from France confirm that most posted workers from low-wage countries are paid exactly at the French minimum wage, demonstrating the bindingness of the third channel, while French workers performing the same tasks receive wages near the French average (approximately €21.1 per hour versus a minimum wage of approximately €10 per hour in 2018).

Q3. What does the cross-sectional evidence show about the relationship between labor cost differentials and posting flows, and how does this compare to goods trade?

Bilateral posting flows and bilateral labor cost differentials have a tight negative cross-sectional relationship with an estimated elasticity of –0.58 (SE 0.08), indicating that countries export more posting services when their labor costs are substantially below those of the destination country. The same exercise applied to bilateral goods trade yields a coefficient of +0.13 (SE 0.07) — weak and marginally positive — consistent with goods trade being driven by capital, technology, and scale rather than labor cost differentials. The gap confirms that labor cost differences are a distinctive comparative advantage mechanism for labor-intensive services but not for less labor-intensive goods.

Q4. What does the Belgian tax shift reform demonstrate, and how is identification established?

Belgium cut employer social security contributions from 33% to 25% between 2016 and 2018 in a revenue-neutral reform (financed by VAT, excise duties, and dividend taxes). The DiD compares posting imports into Belgium with those into France (a neighboring, similarly sized importer on parallel pre-reform trends). Belgium and France imported posting services at similar rates before 2015; Belgian imports slowed immediately after the reform while French imports continued growing. The reduced-form elasticity of posting flows with respect to the destination payroll tax rate is 1.45 (SE 0.3). The elasticity with respect to total labor cost is 3.7 (SE 0.7). No discernible response is detected for trade in manufacturing goods, providing a within-reform placebo. A synthetic control using all available importing countries yields a smaller elasticity of 0.6 (SE 0.22).

Q5. How does the Luxembourg EU regulation reform (2010) improve on the Belgian case for identification?

The 2010 EU regulation required temporary employment agencies in border regions to pay destination-based (rather than origin-based) payroll taxes, raising statutory rates for Luxembourgish exporters from 15% to 44%. Unlike the Belgian reform, this created within-country variation: the same Luxembourgish firms were exposed in the temporary employment sector but not in road transportation (which received a 10-year exemption). This within-exporter, cross-sector design controls for all Luxembourg-wide demand or supply shocks. Posting exports by the temporary employment sector fell 40% relative to pre-reform levels and relative to the domestic (control) sector, while road transportation posting showed zero response. The monthly data confirm the drop occurred in the exact month following the regulation with no anticipation. The triple-difference elasticity (with respect to the payroll tax rate) is –1.37 (SE 0.08).

Q6. What does the bunching evidence at payroll tax duration thresholds add to the DiD findings?

When posting contracts exceed a regulatory duration threshold (24 months during 2010–2020, then 18 months from July 2020), payroll taxes become destination-based. Because France has the highest payroll tax in the EU, all exporting firms face strong incentives to avoid crossing the threshold. The distribution of posting contract lengths in France shows sharp excess mass just below 24 months in 2017. When the threshold moved to 18 months in 2020, the excess mass migrated to the new threshold while diminishing at the old one, confirming that bunching is tax-motivated rather than driven by a reference-point at 24 months. This establishes that labor tax differentials shape not only the quantity of posting contracts (extensive margin) but also their length (intensive margin).

Q7. What are the main findings from the German minimum wage reform, and how do the heterogeneity tests strengthen identification?

Germany’s January 2015 introduction of a national minimum wage of €8.50 per hour (preceded by a sectoral minimum in meat processing in August 2014) raised wage costs for foreign firms providing non-construction services, but not for construction firms already covered by a higher sectoral minimum. Postings to Germany in manufacturing fell by approximately 60% relative to the construction (control) sector, implying a reduced-form elasticity of –1.34 (SE 0.43). Two heterogeneity tests reinforce identification: (i) within the treated German sector, posting declines are monotonically increasing in the degree to which the new minimum wage is binding in the origin country, with Luxembourg (where the minimum is non-binding) showing no statistically significant effect; (ii) the same industry-by-country comparison in Germany’s high-wage neighboring countries (which did not change minimum wage rules) yields placebo estimates statistically indistinguishable from zero. The reform raised wages for German workers by an average of 6% (and up to 10% for most affected workers) but automatically raised wages for posted workers by an average of 40%, doubling them for workers from the poorest sending countries.

Q8. How do the gravity model estimates compare to the reduced-form DiD estimates, and what explains the difference?

Across gravity specifications, model-implied elasticities range from –0.75 to –2.4. The preferred specification — PPML with pair fixed effects, destination-year fixed effects, and origin-year fixed effects — yields θ = –1.2 (SE 0.2). These estimates are systematically below the medium-run reduced-form DiD estimates because: (a) the gravity model uses nationwide average tax and minimum wage measures that introduce measurement error relative to the sector-specific reforms in the case studies; and (b) the gravity model captures year-to-year (short-run) adjustments, while the DiD designs compare outcomes several years before and after the reform, picking up longer-run equilibrium reallocation. The finding that responses grow over time mirrors evidence on dynamic adjustment in goods trade (Boehm, Levchenko and Pandalai-Nayar, 2023), and contradicts the conventional belief that fiscal devaluations boost exports only in the short run.

Q9. What does the gravity model reveal about trade in goods as a function of posting-specific wage costs?

When the same gravity specification is applied to bilateral goods trade rather than posting flows, posting-specific wage costs have a positive — not negative — coefficient on goods trade. This is inconsistent with a model where unobserved shocks affect all exports symmetrically, and instead suggests a small substitution effect: as the cost to import labor services rises (due to tighter posting regulations), countries substitute toward importing goods. For some activities (such as meat processing), importing finished goods is a partial substitute for importing labor services to produce on-site.

Q10. What are the Bolkestein Directive counterfactual implications, and how do they connect to the political economy evidence?

The Bolkestein Directive (proposed 2005) would have enforced a “country of origin principle,” exempting foreign posting firms from destination-country minimum wages. Using the preferred lower-bound elasticity from the gravity model (column 5, θ = –1.2) and an upper bound averaging gravity and DiD estimates, the paper predicts this would have at least doubled exports of labor services from Eastern European countries. Tax revenues collected on posted workers in origin countries would also double. However, average posted workers’ wages would fall by approximately 16%, as workers would lose their entitlement to destination-country minimum wages. The paper documents that the Bolkestein controversy — introduced to the EU Parliament in March 2005 and popularized via the “Polish plumber” trope — coincided with a sharp and permanent drop in French voter support for the EU constitutional treaty, which was subsequently rejected in referendum. This is consistent with Rodrik’s (1998) hypothesis that voters withdraw support for economic integration when comparative advantage appears to be based on institutional choices that conflict with importing countries’ social norms.

Q11. How does the paper handle the incidence of payroll taxes — does the canonical result that payroll taxes are fully passed through to workers hold in this context?

The canonical competitive labor market model predicts full pass-through of payroll taxes to workers’ net wages, leaving firms’ labor costs unchanged. The paper finds substantial trade responses to payroll tax reforms, inconsistent with full pass-through. Nominal rigidities — including binding minimum wages that constrain downward wage adjustment — help rationalize incomplete pass-through in the EU context. The paper estimates elasticities both with respect to statutory tax rates (the reduced-form, making no incidence assumption) and with respect to total wage costs (instrumented with the reform, allowing for gross wage responses). Wage data from Belgium show no distinguishable wage response to the Belgian tax cut, suggesting the incidence fell largely on firms’ costs rather than workers’ wages in that episode.

Q12. What do the destination-based taxation counterfactual (tax cooperation proposal) calculations show?

A proposal to shift all posting payroll taxation to destination-based rates would decrease posting exports from Eastern European countries by between 10% and 25%. Despite the volume reduction, total taxes collected on posted workers would still increase under this reform even when the upper-bound elasticity (approximately –3.7 with respect to total wage cost) is used, because a 1% increase in the payroll tax rate translates to a much smaller proportional increase in total wage cost.

Key Concepts

Posted workers / posting policy: Employees temporarily sent by their employer (the “exporting firm”) to perform a service contract in another EU member state. Posted workers maintain their employment contract with the firm in the origin country but physically work in the destination country. This creates a setting where competing domestic and foreign firms serve the same customers at the same location under different labor regulations.

Posting allowance: The additional wage component that exporting firms must pay to posted workers to satisfy the destination country’s minimum legal wage when that minimum exceeds the firm’s home-country wage level. The posting allowance is zero when the exporting country’s average wage already exceeds the destination minimum wage; it can be large for low-wage origin countries. The allowance enters directly into firms’ labor costs and is the minimum-wage channel of the paper’s labor cost formula.

Origin-based vs. destination-based payroll taxation: Under posting, payroll taxes are normally assessed in the country where the exporting firm is registered (origin-based), creating tax rate differentials between competing firms in the same job site. EU regulations convert payroll taxes to destination-based when posting contracts exceed a duration threshold, eliminating the tax advantage of lower-tax origin countries for those contracts. The 2010 EU regulation additionally imposed destination-based taxation on border-region temporary employment agencies.

Trade elasticity for physical services (θ): The structural parameter from the Eaton-Kortum (2002) gravity model that governs the elasticity of bilateral posting flows with respect to changes in firms’ total wage costs when exporting services from country i to country j. The paper’s preferred estimate is –1.2 (from gravity estimation) to approximately –1.3 to –1.5 (from reduced-form DiD designs), substantially smaller in absolute value than the goods trade elasticity (typically estimated around 5).

Social standards as comparative advantage: The paper uses “standards” to refer to countries’ domestic policy choices about payroll taxes (which finance social insurance programs) and minimum wages (which set worker protection floors). The paper demonstrates that these regulatory choices — distinct from productivity differences, factor abundance, or technology — create measurable cost advantages that shape specialization in labor-intensive service sectors. This is in contrast to “benign” sources of comparative advantage.

Bolkestein Directive / country of origin principle: A 2005 EU legislative proposal that would have required posting firms to operate under the laws of their home country when supplying services in other EU member states, eliminating the hard core of destination-country regulations (including minimum wages) that the 1996 Posted Workers Directive had imposed on foreign firms. The proposal was withdrawn after a wave of protests and its association with a sharp fall in French support for the EU constitutional treaty.

Bunching / notch at duration threshold: A behavioral response in which exporting firms strategically keep posting contract lengths below the duration threshold that triggers destination-based payroll taxation, generating an excess mass in the distribution of contract lengths just below the threshold. The paper uses this bunching, together with the movement of the threshold from 24 to 18 months in 2020, as additional evidence that payroll tax differentials affect the intensive margin of posting.

Who's Afraid of the Minimum Wage? Measuring the Impacts on Independent Businesses Using Matched U.S. Tax Returns

Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000

Layer 1 — Overview

Research Question

This paper asks how independent (pass-through) businesses in the United States accommodate minimum wage increases — specifically whether they reduce employment, compress profits, pass costs through to customers, or exit — and what happens to the low-earning workers and business owners affected by these adjustments.

Data and Methodology

The authors construct a novel linked firm-worker-owner panel dataset from the universe of U.S. tax returns, covering approximately 235,000 pass-through firms (S-corporations, partnerships, and LLCs) per year in highly exposed industries over 2010–2019. “Highly exposed” industries are defined as those where at least 15% of workers earned below the full-time equivalent of the federal minimum wage ($15,080 per year) in 2013. The dataset links annual business income tax returns to the individual income tax returns and W-2 information reports of all workers and owners.

The causal identification strategy exploits the six state minimum wage increases that took effect in 2014 (California, Connecticut, Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota, and New Jersey) relative to 24 states that did not change their wage floors at any point from 2012–2018. The empirical workhorse is a panel difference-in-differences event study (Equation 1), augmented by DFL re-weighting (DiNardo et al., 1996) to improve comparability of treatment and control firms on observables. The analysis covers cumulative effects through 2018, by which point the average minimum wage across treatment states had risen 30.6%.

Main Findings

Employment: The average exposed independent firm does not meaningfully reduce employment. The authors estimate an own-wage elasticity of -0.209 (s.e. = 0.0112). Employment adjustments manifest as moderately lower hiring rather than layoffs of existing workers. Reduced hiring is wholly concentrated among teenagers and very part-time jobs paying less than $3,900 annually (with 67% earning less than $1,000 per year).
Worker earnings: Despite the hiring reduction, low-earning workers employed at exposed independent firms experience average earnings gains of approximately $2,000 per year by 2018, relative to comparable workers in untreated states. Young individuals aged 20–26 without a 2013 job earn roughly $4,000 more per year by 2018; teenagers without a 2013 job gain approximately $1,000 per year. Workers in these groups are no less likely — and in some cases slightly more likely — to be employed five years after the minimum wage increase.
Wage bills: Average wage bills among surviving treated firms rose 7.03% (s.e. = 0.0153) by 2018. Earnings gains are concentrated among workers earning $15,600–$35,000 annually, with no evidence of reduced earnings for higher-paid workers. The 7% average wage bill increase amounts to only 1.4% of 2013 firm revenues, easing pass-through.
Revenue and profits: Revenues of surviving treated firms grew approximately 2.1% more than control firms by 2018. On average, this revenue increase fully offsets the higher wage bill, yielding a small net profit increase of roughly $3,360 (s.e. = $1,123) per owner by 2018, or about 2.7% of mean 2013 owner income.
Firm exit: On average across all highly exposed industries, minimum wages increased the five-year exit probability by 0.9 percentage points (s.e. = 0.0029), relative to a baseline raw exit rate of approximately 29%. Exit effects are driven entirely by restaurants: by 2018, restaurants in treated states were 1.85 percentage points (s.e. = 0.0039) more likely to have exited, while the exit response for non-restaurant exposed firms is a precisely estimated zero.
Heterogeneity by productivity within restaurants: Exit is concentrated entirely in the bottom productivity quartile (coefficient = 0.0254, s.e. = 0.0079), with no significant effect in the upper three quartiles. Profits among surviving small restaurants rise by $5,941 (s.e. = $1,546) by 2018 relative to 2013. Among small restaurants, the profit gains are larger for firms in the higher productivity quartiles (Q3: +$7,915; Q4: +$9,161). Surviving restaurants also increase non-labor input spending by 2.53% (s.e. = 0.0101), consistent with expanded output following competitor exits.
Entrant characteristics: Post-reform restaurant entrants in treatment states have higher wage bills (13.8% higher in logs), higher revenues (4.0% higher), higher value-added (8.4% higher), and higher productivity (net income/revenue ratio 2.24 percentage points higher) than entrants in control states, indicating the minimum wage raises the productivity floor for new entrants.
Owner outcomes after exit: Owners of small restaurants forced out by the minimum wage are significantly less likely to own an independent business five years later, but earn no less on average in wages plus business income. Policy-induced exiters are significantly less likely to report negative incomes, suggesting substitution away from risky or marginally profitable business ownership.

Theoretical Framework

The authors present a Cournot competition model with heterogeneous firm productivity and fixed production costs. A minimum wage cost shock raises marginal costs, narrowing margins for all firms. Firms whose cost increases exceed the market price increase cannot cover fixed costs and exit. Remaining firms gain higher markups and larger market shares as demand is reallocated from exiting firms. Selection on ex-ante productivity (the least productive firms exit) limits the distortion to market quantity and amplifies profit gains among productive survivors. The model predicts profit increases only in markets with firm exit, which matches the data: profits rise among restaurants (where exit occurs) but not among retailers (where exit is a precisely estimated zero).

Scope Conditions

Findings pertain to the short-to-medium run (up to five years post-legislation) of phased-in minimum wage increases averaging 30.6% in six U.S. states. The sample covers pass-through (independent) businesses in highly exposed industries. Longer-run effects may differ if entrants adopt production technologies that rely less on low-wage labor or incumbents reconfigure inputs. Border-county retailers appear to be less able to pass through costs than interior firms, suggesting product market competition is a key moderating factor.

In depth

Q1. Why do the authors focus on pass-through businesses rather than publicly traded corporations?

Pass-throughs (S-corporations, partnerships, and LLCs) comprise 78% of non-sole-proprietorship businesses and 79% of firms with fewer than 20 employees. They represent the majority organizational form for independent businesses in virtually all two-digit NAICS industry groups except utilities and enterprise management. Because minimum wage concerns are disproportionately raised on behalf of small independent businesses, and because most minimum wage workers in restaurants are employed at pass-throughs, studying pass-throughs directly addresses the policy debate. Additionally, pass-through tax returns link business income directly to the individual tax returns of each owner, enabling the authors to separately identify employee versus owner responses.

Q2. How do the authors define “highly exposed” industries and why does this matter for identification?

Highly exposed industries are defined as four-digit NAICS industries where at least 15% of workers earned below the full-time federal minimum wage equivalent ($15,080 per year) in 2013, using tax data to construct a proxy for minimum wage workers. The analysis focuses on these industries because minimum wage workers are extremely concentrated — the vast majority are in Leisure/Hospitality and Retail. Restricting to highly exposed industries allows the authors to estimate average effects within affected markets and conduct heterogeneity analysis across firm characteristics within those markets, including comparing firms with different baseline shares of low-earning workers that nonetheless all face the market-level cost shock.

Q3. How do the employment effects decompose into hiring versus retention?

The average firm subject to a higher wage floor does not lay off existing workers (the retention line is flat in event study estimates). By 2018, firms in treated states hire roughly one fewer worker on average than similar firms in control states, entirely through reduced hiring. This reduced hiring is wholly concentrated among teenagers in very part-time jobs: the missing hires consist entirely of workers who would have earned less than $3,900 annually, with 67% earning less than $1,000 per year. Simultaneously, workers already employed at exposed firms are 2 to 4 percentage points more likely to remain with their 2013 employer by 2016, with prime-age low-earning workers exhibiting the largest retention increases.

Q4. What happens to low-earning workers and young people in individual-level panels?

Low-earners (those earning below $25,000 in each year from 2012–2014) at exposed independent firms experience average earnings gains of approximately $2,000 per year by 2018 relative to similar workers in untreated states, including teenage low-earners. Young individuals aged 20–26 with no job in 2013 experience a relative earnings increase of approximately $4,000 per year by 2018; teenagers without jobs in 2013 gain approximately $1,000 per year. These workers are no less likely — and often slightly more likely — to be employed relative to their counterparts in control states, so the earnings gains are not offset by employment losses at the individual level.

Q5. What is the magnitude of the cost shock for firms and how does it compare to revenues?

By 2018, the average wage bill among surviving firms in treated states was 7.03% (s.e. = 0.0153) higher than comparable firms in control states. This is consistent with a back-of-envelope calculation: low-earning workers account for about 21% of wage bills at these firms, and states raised minimum wages by 30.6% on average (0.21 × 0.306 = 0.064). However, the 7% wage bill increase amounts to only approximately 1.4% of 2013 firm revenues, making cost pass-through relatively modest. Higher minimum wages have no discernible impact on pension contributions but slightly reduce deductions for other benefits including health insurance.

Q6. How do surviving firms finance the increased wage bill, and what happens to profits?

Surviving firms finance the wage increase primarily through higher revenues. By 2018, revenues of firms in treated states grew approximately 2.1% more than revenues of firms in control states. On average, this revenue increase outpaces the higher wage bill, resulting in a net profit increase of approximately $3,360 (s.e. = $1,123) per owner by 2018, representing about 2.7% of mean 2013 owner income. There is no evidence of redistribution from middle- or high-income workers within firms; wage bill increases are concentrated among workers earning $15,600–$35,000 annually, consistent with minimum wage spillovers to workers slightly above the statutory floor.

Q7. Why do restaurants experience exit effects but retailers do not?

The asymmetry stems from the intensity of low-wage labor in production. While low-earning workers account for a similar share of labor costs at restaurants (41.8%) and retailers (38.5%), labor costs overall are more than twice as large at restaurants relative to retailers. Wage bills account for 39% of variable costs and 27% of revenues at restaurants, but only 16% of variable costs and 13% of revenues at retailers. As a result, raising the minimum wage raises variable costs by 5.76% at restaurants. Non-restaurant exposed firms are able to fully pass through their smaller cost shock, yielding flat profits and neither employment nor exit impacts.

Q8. Why is firm exit concentrated in the lowest productivity quartile of restaurants rather than among the most exposed firms?

The Cournot framework predicts exits among firms with the lowest ex-ante productivity (highest marginal costs), the largest cost shock (highest share of low-wage labor per unit of output), or a combination. Empirically, productivity is the primary determinant: restaurants across all productivity quartiles use similar shares of low-earning workers (40–44% of wage bills for Q1 through Q4). Exit rises significantly only among restaurants in the bottom productivity quartile (coefficient = 0.0254, s.e. = 0.0079), with no significant effects in Q2–Q4. Among the lowest-productivity restaurants, those most dependent on low-earning labor face the largest exit rates.

Q9. How do the model’s predictions about profit heterogeneity match the data?

The Cournot model predicts profits should rise only in markets with firm exit (via increased margins and market share reallocation to survivors). This is exactly what the data show. Among restaurants, where exit is concentrated in the bottom productivity quartile, profits among surviving small restaurants rise by $5,941 (s.e. = $1,546) by 2018. Among small restaurants specifically, profit gains increase with productivity: Q3 restaurants gain $7,915 (s.e. = $3,326) and Q4 restaurants gain $9,161 (s.e. = $2,127), while Q1 and Q2 gains are statistically indistinguishable from zero. In non-restaurant exposed industries where the exit effect is a precise zero, profits are also flat — exactly as the model predicts.

Q10. What happens to the characteristics of new restaurant entrants after the minimum wage increase?

Post-reform restaurant entrants in treatment states are systematically more productive than entrants in control states. They have wage bills 13.8% higher (in logs), revenues 4.0% higher, value-added 8.4% higher, and productivity ratios (net income/revenue) 2.24 percentage points higher than new entrants in control markets. This implies the minimum wage raises the minimum viable productivity threshold for entrant restaurants, consistent with Sorkin (2015)’s insight that minimum wages shape the capital and technology choices of entering firms. The restaurant industry thus becomes more productive on average through both the exit of the least productive incumbents and the entry of more productive new firms.

Q11. How do worker transition patterns reflect the reallocation of output to surviving firms?

Workers at large independent businesses (top revenue quartile) are 3.52 percentage points more likely to remain with their 2013 employer in 2018 and 2.36 percentage points less likely to switch to another large firm. The large firms that retain more of their existing workforce also reduce their hiring of very part-time teenagers the most — in the top revenue quartile, firms shed roughly 4.5 employment relationships on average, comprising higher retention of 4.15 existing workers offset by reduced hiring of 8.67 very part-time teenage workers. Workers originally at smaller exposed firms are more likely to be found working at larger firms five years out, consistent with demand reallocation from exiting and shrinking small firms toward larger, more productive survivors.

Q12. What happens to owners of restaurants that exit due to the minimum wage?

Policy-induced exiters of small restaurants are significantly less likely to own an independent business five years later and less likely to receive all earnings from business ownership, relative to owners of restaurants that exited for other reasons in control states. However, their average incomes (wage income plus ordinary business income) are no lower. This income stability is partly explained by the fact that policy-induced exiters are significantly less likely to report negative incomes five years out, suggesting they substitute away from potentially risky or marginally profitable business ownership toward wage employment or other activities. The utility implications are ambiguous: these former owners may have preferred business ownership even if it did not yield higher income.

Q13. What is the role of product market competition in mediating pass-through, as evidenced by border-county analysis?

The border county robustness analysis reveals that product market competition is central to pass-through success. Retailers near state borders, where consumers can cross-state-border shop, face more elastic demand and are less able to finance the wage cost shock with new revenues, exhibiting reduced profits and higher exit rates (though estimates are imprecise). Further from the border, where the cost shock is more commonly felt by all potential substitutes (making market demand elasticity rather than firm demand elasticity the relevant parameter), results are very similar to the full-sample aggregate findings. This confirms that the common nature of the minimum wage cost shock — shared by all competing firms in the market — is a key reason firms can pass through costs to consumers.

Q14. How do the findings address the divide among independent business owners on minimum wage policy?

The heterogeneous outcomes rationalize why surveys consistently find business owners divided. Among restaurants, some owners (those operating the least productive small restaurants) face exit and loss of business ownership, while surviving productive restaurateurs see higher profits of $5,941–$9,161 per year. Among non-restaurant exposed businesses, owners are broadly unaffected in terms of profits and viability. Uncertainty about whether a given firm’s demand is elastic enough to bear cost pass-through — given that owners may be more familiar with the elasticity of firm-level demand from prior unilateral price changes, rather than the relevant market-level demand elasticity applying to a common cost shock — may broaden opposition to include even owners who would ultimately benefit.

Key Concepts

Pass-through businesses (independent businesses): Privately owned firms organized as S-corporations, partnerships, or LLCs, taxed by passing income through to the individual returns of owners rather than at the entity level. In 2015, these comprised 78% of non-sole-proprietorship U.S. businesses and 46% of employment. The paper uses “pass-through” and “independent business” interchangeably as the unit of analysis.

Highly exposed industries: Four-digit NAICS industries where at least 15% of workers earned below the annual full-time equivalent of the federal minimum wage ($15,080) in 2013, as measured in the authors’ administrative tax data. This threshold proxies the concentration of minimum-wage workers across industries and drives the sample selection for firm-level analysis.

Own-wage elasticity of employment: The estimated percentage change in employment at a firm associated with a given percentage change in the firm’s minimum wage. The authors estimate this as -0.209 (s.e. = 0.0112), reflecting the average effect across all exposed independent businesses, conditional on the firm’s industry, size, and local market characteristics.

DFL re-weighting (DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux): A non-parametric reweighting procedure that adjusts the distribution of control-group firms to match the distribution of treatment-group firms on observables (specifically, two-year lagged value-added within three-digit NAICS industries). Used to improve pre-reform comparability of treatment and control firm samples without parametric functional form assumptions.

Firm productivity (in this paper’s sense): Measured as the ratio of net profits to revenues (net income/revenue) at the firm level in the base year 2013, used to assign firms to productivity quartiles for heterogeneity analysis. This is a firm-level profitability measure constructed from pass-through tax returns, not a total factor productivity estimate requiring production function estimation.

Firm exit: An indicator for a firm that filed a tax return in 2013 but did not file a return in a subsequent year t. The average one-year exit rate for highly exposed independent businesses is 5.2%; the cumulative five-year raw exit rate is approximately 29% across treatment and control states.

Cournot competition with heterogeneous productivity and fixed costs: The paper’s conceptual framework, in which N firms compete in quantities with asymmetric marginal costs (reflecting heterogeneous productivity), a common output price, and a fixed cost of production. Under this framework, a minimum wage cost shock narrows margins unevenly, induces exit among firms that cannot cover fixed costs, and generates both demand reallocation and market share gains for productive survivors — rationalizing simultaneous exit and profit increases in the same industry.

Common cost shock: The property that a minimum wage increase raises production costs for all firms employing low-wage workers in the same market simultaneously. Because all competing firms face higher costs, the relevant pass-through parameter is the elasticity of market demand rather than the (higher) elasticity of individual firm demand, facilitating cost pass-through to consumers and distinguishing minimum wages from unilateral price changes by a single firm.