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Valentina Bruno · Hyun Song Shin

Bank leverage is the linchpin of a risk-taking channel through which monetary policy travels across borders: in a pre-crisis quarterly VAR a tighter US policy rate raises the VIX, lowers broker-dealer …

Cristina Arellano

In a small open economy where a risk-averse government borrows from risk-neutral lenders using only non-contingent one-period bonds, default happens in equilibrium and happens in *recessions* -- the …

John Ammer · Stijn Claessens · Alexandra Tabova · Caleb Wroblewski

When the sovereign yield in an investor's own country falls, that country's private investors hold more U.S. bonds and tilt the mix toward riskier corporate debt rather than Treasuries. Across 31 …

Mauricio Barbosa-Alves · Javier Bianchi · César Sosa-Padilla

The paper extends the Cole-Kehoe (2000) sovereign rollover crisis model to include international reserves and derives the joint optimal management of sovereign debt and reserves in a small open …

Chun-Che Chi

This paper studies how the lender structure of external debt — specifically, the degree to which a borrowing country's external debt is concentrated among a small number of large lenders — affects …

Wenxin Du · Jesse Schreger

Emerging-market governments that borrow in their own currency still pay a measurable default premium: stripping out currency risk with cross-currency swaps leaves a "local currency credit spread" …

Toni Ahnert · Kristin Forbes · Christian Friedrich · Dennis Reinhardt

Macroprudential rules on banks' foreign currency exposure do what they are meant to do -- cross-border FX borrowing by banks falls by roughly a third, and bank stock returns become markedly less …

Árpád Ábrahám · Eva Carceles-Poveda · Yan Liu · Ramon Marimon

This paper asks how to optimally design a Financial Stability Fund (Fund) for a union of sovereign countries that must simultaneously (i) prevent sovereign default, (ii) provide risk-sharing and …

Harold L. Cole · Timothy Kehoe

A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which a government that must roll over one-period debt can be forced into default purely because lenders expect it -- and a characterisation of …

Mark Aguiar · Manuel Amador

A Handbook survey that organises the economics of sovereign debt around a single benchmark limited-commitment model, then shows how each strand of the literature -- debt overhang, equilibrium default, …

Jeremy Bulow · Kenneth Rogoff

A sovereign that can still hold assets abroad after defaulting can always replace any reputation-based loan contract with a sequence of cash-in-advance insurance contracts collateralised out of the …

Juan J Cruces · Christoph Trebesch

The first present-value estimates of creditor losses for all 180 sovereign debt restructurings with foreign banks and bondholders between 1978 and 2010 -- average haircut 37%, with half the cases …

Benjamin Hébert · Jesse Schreger

US court rulings in Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital moved the market-implied probability that Argentina would default on its restructured bonds without carrying any news about the Argentine …

Philip R. Lane · Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti

Capital flows were tracked continuously, but the stocks of foreign assets and liabilities they accumulate into were largely unmeasured outside a handful of industrial countries. This paper builds …