D82

Takuo Sugaya · Alexander Wolitzky

This paper asks how a third-party intermediary (an “algorithm”) that observes market demand or costs superior to competing firms should optimally disclose that information to maximize the …

Marco Cosconati · Yi Xin · Fan Wu · Yizhou Jin

This paper studies imperfect competition in selection markets where competing firms have heterogeneous information about consumers — a layer of asymmetry distinct from the classic buyer-seller …

Sara G Castellanos · Diego Jiménez-Hernández · Aprajit Mahajan · Eduardo Alcaraz Prous · Enrique Seira

Layer 1 — Overview Research Question This paper asks two related questions bearing on financial inclusion policy in developing countries: (1) How effective are credit card contract term changes — …

Tan Gan · Nicholas Wu

This paper studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which an informed seller sells an experience good to a skeptical buyer who learns about the product through consumption. The central question …

Aimé Bierdel · Andres Drenik · Juan Herreño · Pablo Ottonello

The paper develops a quantitative capital-accumulation model in which capital trades in illiquid markets with asymmetric information — sellers know the quality of their capital but buyers do not. It …

Benjamin L. Collier · Cameron M. Ellis · Benjamin J. Keys

Layer 1: Overview This paper estimates the shadow cost that consumers assign to pledging their primary residence as collateral, using administrative loan application and performance data from the U.S. …

Mikhail Golosov · Ilia Krasikov

Layer 1 — Overview Research Question. What is the optimal joint nonlinear earnings tax schedule for married couples? How should one spouse’s marginal tax rate depend on the other’s …