D43

Takuo Sugaya · Alexander Wolitzky

This paper asks how a third-party intermediary (an “algorithm”) that observes market demand or costs superior to competing firms should optimally disclose that information to maximize the …

Marco Cosconati · Yi Xin · Fan Wu · Yizhou Jin

This paper studies imperfect competition in selection markets where competing firms have heterogeneous information about consumers — a layer of asymmetry distinct from the classic buyer-seller …

Ilwoo Hwang · Kyungmin Kim · Raphael Boleslavsky

Hwang, Kim, and Boleslavsky study how firms in an oligopoly simultaneously choose prices and advertising strategies, where advertising is modeled as the choice of how much product information to …

Matthew Elliott · Andrea Galeotti · Andrew Koh · Wenhao Li

This paper asks what market outcomes an information designer — modeled as an internet platform that knows consumers’ preferences — can achieve by choosing what information to disclose to …

Vivek Bhattacharya · Gastón Illanes · David Stillerman

This paper by Bhattacharya, Illanes, and Stillerman makes two contributions to the debate over US antitrust enforcement stringency. First, it documents the price, quantity, and assortment effects of a …

Daron Acemoglu · Daniel Huttenlocher · Asuman Ozdaglar · James Siderius

Acemoglu, Huttenlocher, Ozdaglar, and Siderius develop a two-sided platform model to study the welfare consequences of digital advertising as an online business model. The platform intermediates …

Jan Eeckhout · Chunyang Fu · Wenjian Li · Xi Weng

Overview This paper asks whether and how optimal income taxation should change when firms have market power. The question is motivated by the documented rise in economy-wide markups since 1980, which …