This paper asks how a third-party intermediary (an "algorithm") that observes market demand or costs superior to competing firms should optimally disclose that information to maximize the firms' …
Online FirstReview of Economic StudiesOnline 16 Jun 2026
This paper studies imperfect competition in selection markets where competing firms have heterogeneous information about consumers — a layer of asymmetry distinct from the classic buyer-seller …
Online FirstReview of Economic StudiesOnline 18 Jun 2026
Hwang, Kim, and Boleslavsky study how firms in an oligopoly simultaneously choose prices and advertising strategies, where advertising is modeled as the choice of how much product information to …
If households form habits over individual goods rather than over a consumption aggregate, the demand a firm faces depends on its own past sales, its pricing problem becomes dynamic, and mark-ups turn …
Online FirstReview of Economic StudiesOnline 17 Jun 2026
This paper asks what market outcomes an information designer — modeled as an internet platform that knows consumers' preferences — can achieve by choosing what information to disclose to competing …
PublishedAmerican Economic ReviewPublished Aug 2026
This paper by Bhattacharya, Illanes, and Stillerman makes two contributions to the debate over US antitrust enforcement stringency. First, it documents the price, quantity, and assortment effects of a …
Online FirstJournal of Political EconomyOnline 15 Jun 2026
Acemoglu, Huttenlocher, Ozdaglar, and Siderius develop a two-sided platform model to study the welfare consequences of digital advertising as an online business model. The platform intermediates …
PublishedAmerican Economic ReviewOnline 1 Jan 2026Published Jan 2026
This paper asks whether and how optimal income taxation should change when firms have market power. The question is motivated by the documented rise in economy-wide markups since 1980, which has …