<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>B31 | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/jel_codes/b31/</link><description>B31</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/jel_codes/b31/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Government Equity and Money: John Law's System in 1720 France</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/government-equity-and-money-john-laws-system-in-1720-france/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/government-equity-and-money-john-laws-system-in-1720-france/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;John Law&amp;rsquo;s &amp;ldquo;System,&amp;rdquo; carried out in France between 1716 and 1720, restructured French public finance around two linked innovations: converting most of the existing government debt into equity in a single, government-chartered trading and tax-collecting company, and replacing silver coin with paper bank notes as the primary medium of exchange. Velde traces the System&amp;rsquo;s four stages &amp;ndash; the 1716 General Bank, whose notes gained acceptance partly because they were protected against the recurrent devaluations of the silver coinage; the 1717-1719 Company of the West, which grew by acquiring the tobacco monopoly, the General Farms tax-collection lease, the direct-tax collection offices, and the royal mints; the 1719-1720 merger of Bank and Company, in which the Company took over the entire national debt in exchange for its shares and its notes became sole legal tender; and the 1720 collapse and multi-year &amp;ldquo;Visa&amp;rdquo; liquidation that followed. Velde argues the System&amp;rsquo;s viability depended on convincing bondholders to convert voluntarily by keeping the Company&amp;rsquo;s share price high, and estimates, from the Company&amp;rsquo;s own disclosed revenue projections compared with post-System market valuations, that shares were overvalued at their January 1720 peak by a factor of roughly two to five; sustaining that price required an escalating volume of bank notes, which by spring 1720 was outrunning the demand for money and forced a sequence of increasingly coercive and self-contradictory monetary measures. Once Law&amp;rsquo;s price-support operations proved unsustainable in the spring of 1720, note issue could not be reversed in an orderly way, and the System unwound through a formal liquidation, the Visa, that converted the remaining notes, shares, and company bonds back into ordinary government annuities. The paper&amp;rsquo;s central quantitative finding is that, despite the scale and drama of the episode, France&amp;rsquo;s public debt in the mid-1720s stood at roughly the same level as in 1717, so that &amp;ndash; unlike most French sovereign-debt episodes of the era &amp;ndash; Law&amp;rsquo;s System was not, in net terms, a default.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>