<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Zijian Wang | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/zijian-wang/</link><description>Zijian Wang</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/zijian-wang/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Payment data, information disclosure, and privacy</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/payment-data-information-disclosure-and-privacy/</link><pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/payment-data-information-disclosure-and-privacy/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Research question and motivation: Digital payments generate vast, high-frequency, transaction-level data that several central banks (Bank of Canada, Swiss National Bank, Eurosystem members) already use for nowcasting, and regulatory initiatives (the EU&amp;rsquo;s PSD2, the UK&amp;rsquo;s Open Banking Standard, prospective CBDCs) are broadening system-wide data access. The paper asks how improved aggregate-demand forecasts enabled by payment data affect economic activity and through which channels; what the optimal communication policy for disseminating such forecasts is and how it depends on the monetary-policy stance; whether a competitive market in which private banks produce and sell forecasts is socially optimal; and how privacy concerns over individual transaction data affect optimal policy.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>