<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Virginia Minni | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/virginia-minni/</link><description>Virginia Minni</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/virginia-minni/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Making the Invisible Hand Visible: Managers and the Allocation of Workers to Jobs</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/making-the-invisible-hand-visible-managers-and-the-allocation-of-workers-to-jobs/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/making-the-invisible-hand-visible-managers-and-the-allocation-of-workers-to-jobs/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This paper asks why managers matter for firm performance, and specifically whether managers improve productivity by matching workers to better-suited jobs inside firms rather than through supervision, motivation, or selection out of the firm. The setting is the internal labor market of a large private consumer goods multinational enterprise (MNE) operating in more than 100 countries, with annual turnover exceeding EUR 50 billion. The data cover the universe of white-collar workers and managers at the firm — 200,000 workers and 30,000 managers observed monthly over 11 years (January 2011 to December 2021) — linked to payroll, performance ratings, organizational chart, digital platform activity, employee surveys, and an independent sales productivity series for field sales workers in 15 countries.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>