<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Tuo Chen | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/tuo-chen/</link><description>Tuo Chen</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/tuo-chen/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Non-Tariff Barriers in the U.S.-China Trade War</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/non-tariff-barriers-in-the-u.s.-china-trade-war/</link><pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/non-tariff-barriers-in-the-u.s.-china-trade-war/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Chen, Hsieh, and Song study the use of unofficial non-tariff barriers (NTBs) by China during the U.S.-China trade war of 2018–2019 and in the first year of the Phase 1 purchase agreement (2020). The central motivation is that much prior analysis of the trade war focused on announced tariff hikes, yet abundant anecdotal evidence — permit requirements for U.S. pet food, pest-inspection orders on U.S. apples and lumber, changes to pig-feed formulas reducing soybean content — points to a parallel, opaque regulatory channel. The critical puzzle the paper highlights is that China&amp;rsquo;s purchases of U.S. goods rose by 156 percent between 2019 and 2020 without any reduction in tariffs, which is only explicable if NTBs were used in reverse to favour U.S. exporters during the Phase 1 period.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>