<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Sweder Van Wijnbergen | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/sweder-van-wijnbergen/</link><description>Sweder Van Wijnbergen</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/sweder-van-wijnbergen/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Financial Fragility and the Fiscal Multiplier</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/financial-fragility-and-the-fiscal-multiplier/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/financial-fragility-and-the-fiscal-multiplier/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Research question and motivation: Does fiscal stimulus still work when it is financed through a banking system that is undercapitalized and holds large quantities of risky domestic government bonds? This was a first-order policy question in Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Portugal — &amp;ldquo;SIP&amp;rdquo;) during the 2011–2013 European sovereign debt crisis, and the authors argue it is relevant again as central banks raise rates after the Zero Lower Bound. Motivating stylized facts: Spanish banks held domestic sovereign debt equal to more than 150% of Tier-1 capital (Italian banks ~200%, Greek banks ~250% at end-2011); CDS spreads on Italian and Spanish sovereign debt rose from ~100 bps in January 2010 to above 400 bps in 2012–2013 (Portugal exceeded 1000 bps at end-2011); VAR evidence shows sovereign-spread pass-through to corporate lending rates is nearly complete within six months. Gennaioli et al. (2018) document that 12.7% of emerging-market commercial bank assets are (mostly domestic) government bonds, extending relevance beyond Europe.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>