<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Sarah Zubairy | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/sarah-zubairy/</link><description>Sarah Zubairy</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/sarah-zubairy/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Government Spending Multipliers in Good Times and in Bad: Evidence from US Historical Data</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/government-spending-multipliers-in-good-times-and-in-bad-evidence-from-us-historical-data/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/government-spending-multipliers-in-good-times-and-in-bad-evidence-from-us-historical-data/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Using a newly constructed quarterly US data set spanning 1889–2015 — built specifically to include the large wars and deep recessions that the post-WWII sample most of the literature relies on simply lacks — Ramey and Zubairy estimate government spending multipliers that are below unity regardless of whether the economy has slack (as measured by the unemployment rate), a finding that holds across two different spending-shock identification schemes (a military-spending &amp;ldquo;news&amp;rdquo; series and the Blanchard-Perotti shock) and across two different estimation methods (Jordà local projections and a threshold VAR). They find no evidence that multipliers are higher during high-unemployment states than low-unemployment states; the one case where multipliers differ significantly by state (using the Blanchard-Perotti shock) is driven by unusually low multipliers in low-unemployment states, not by elevated multipliers in high-unemployment ones. For the zero lower bound, the evidence is more mixed: across the full sample there is no evidence of multipliers above one, but once the WWII rationing period (1941q3–1945q4) is excluded, some specifications — particularly using the military news shock — imply multipliers as high as 1.4. The authors also show that a leading contrary finding in the literature, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko&amp;rsquo;s (2012) estimated 2.24 five-year recession multiplier, rests on an assumption that the economy stays in the recession state for the full horizon used to compute the multiplier, which is a poor approximation since their own data show recessions lasting only a few quarters on average; using a more data-consistent assumption about how the economy transitions between states brings their estimated recession multiplier down to about unity, in line with Ramey and Zubairy&amp;rsquo;s own numbers.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>