<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Robert Hall | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/robert-hall/</link><description>Robert Hall</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/robert-hall/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Risk Premium Shocks Can Create Inefficient Recessions</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/risk-premium-shocks-can-create-inefficient-recessions/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/risk-premium-shocks-can-create-inefficient-recessions/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This paper proposes a flexible-price model of business cycles driven by spikes in uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, built by adding one friction &amp;ndash; entrepreneurs&amp;rsquo; inability to insure the idiosyncratic risk in their own production &amp;ndash; to an otherwise standard neoclassical growth model with workers and entrepreneurs. When aggregate shocks raise idiosyncratic risk, entrepreneurs demand a risk premium to compensate for bearing it, which shows up as a countercyclical wedge that effectively taxes both labour and capital; but because capital is a long-duration store of value, a concurrent precautionary-saving motive lowers interest rates and offsets the risk premium&amp;rsquo;s drag on investment demand, while labour, having no such store-of-value role, is left depressed by the risk premium alone. The paper derives a sufficient statistic showing that, calibrated to U.S. data, these two offsetting forces on capital roughly cancel, so risk shocks act almost purely as a tax on labour &amp;ndash; generating recessions in which employment, consumption, and investment decline together, quantitatively broadly consistent with U.S. business-cycle facts. This competitive-equilibrium response is shown to be inefficient: because individual agents take interest rates and the market price of risk as given, they do not internalize that their own consumption choices affect aggregate idiosyncratic risk sharing, so a fall in aggregate consumption during a downturn worsens risk sharing and pushes risk premiums higher still, in a self-reinforcing spiral. A constrained-efficient planner who faces the same limits on idiosyncratic risk sharing responds very differently &amp;ndash; lowering labour taxes and raising capital taxes during downturns, which stimulates employment and raises consumption on impact rather than letting it fall &amp;ndash; so that optimal policy calls for subsidizing employment and consumption, not investment, during recessions.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>