<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>R. J. Barro | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/r.-j.-barro/</link><description>R. J. Barro</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/r.-j.-barro/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Currency Unions</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/currency-unions/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/currency-unions/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This 2002 Quarterly Journal of Economics paper by Alberto Alesina and Robert Barro builds a formal model of which countries should give up their own currency and adopt another country&amp;rsquo;s, combining a real trade/country-size model with a Barro-Gordon (1983) rules-versus-discretion monetary model. In the real side, competitive final-goods producers combine differentiated, monopolistically-supplied intermediate goods subject to an iceberg trading cost between countries; a reduction in this cost, including via a shared currency, raises consumption in both trading partners, and does so more for a country that trades a lot with its partner and for a country that is small relative to the world number of varieties. On the monetary side, a country that cannot itself commit to low inflation faces a discretionary inflation bias (the Barro-Gordon outcome); linking to an anchor country that can commit avoids this bias but costs the client both the ability to react to its own idiosyncratic output shocks and exposure to relative-price shocks between the two countries&amp;rsquo; consumption baskets. Combining the two channels, the paper shows that a country gains more from adopting an anchor&amp;rsquo;s currency the harder it would find it to commit to low inflation on its own, the more it trades with and the more its business cycle is correlated with a large, low-inflation anchor, and the smaller it is. The paper also shows that a smaller anchor is less able to sustain a monetary-policy commitment against ex post pressure from a large client (the &amp;ldquo;Russia-Estonia&amp;rdquo; problem), and works out how an anchor&amp;rsquo;s optimal policy changes if clients compensate it for partially accommodating their disturbances. Finally, aggregating these individual decisions across many countries arranged by distance/trade intensity, the model predicts that currency unions form among adjacent, closely-linked countries, and that as the number of independent countries in the world rises, the equilibrium number of currencies in circulation can rise less than proportionally, or even fall.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>