<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Piotr Eliasz | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/piotr-eliasz/</link><description>Piotr Eliasz</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/piotr-eliasz/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Measuring the Effects of Monetary Policy: A Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) Approach</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/measuring-the-effects-of-monetary-policy-a-factor-augmented-vector-autoregressive-favar-approach/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/measuring-the-effects-of-monetary-policy-a-factor-augmented-vector-autoregressive-favar-approach/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This 2005 Quarterly Journal of Economics paper by Ben Bernanke, Jean Boivin, and Piotr Eliasz proposes the Factor-Augmented VAR (FAVAR) to address a specific problem with standard small monetary VARs: because Fed policymakers actually condition on a wide range of economic and financial data, a VAR built from only a handful of observable series omits conditioning information, which biases the identified policy shock (producing the &amp;ldquo;price puzzle,&amp;rdquo; a spurious rise in prices after a tightening), makes the choice of which few variables to include arbitrary, and limits impulse responses to only the included series. The FAVAR augments a standard VAR in observable variables (in the benchmark specification, just the federal funds rate) with a small number of latent factors extracted by principal components from a large panel of 120 monthly U.S. macroeconomic series (DRI/McGraw Hill Basic Economics Database, January 1959-August 2001); the factors and the observable are then modeled jointly in a VAR (13 lags, 3 factors in the benchmark), with the policy shock identified recursively (Cholesky) by ordering the federal funds rate last, and with the factors themselves estimated in a first step using only &amp;ldquo;slow-moving&amp;rdquo; variables that do not respond contemporaneously to policy shocks, so as not to contaminate the factor estimates with the policy shock itself. Two estimation approaches are compared: a computationally simple two-step principal-components procedure (following Stock and Watson 2002), which the authors prefer for its &amp;ldquo;greater plausibility,&amp;rdquo; and a one-step Bayesian likelihood approach via Gibbs sampling (10,000 draws, 2,000 discarded as burn-in) that is more rigorous but yields qualitatively similar, quantitatively more imprecise results. Moving from a standard three-variable VAR (industrial production, CPI, funds rate), which produces a strong and persistent price puzzle, to a FAVAR with even a single additional factor considerably reduces the puzzle; the preferred three-factor, two-step-PC FAVAR generates impulse responses for many more series that are broadly consistent with standard theory (real activity and prices eventually decline, money aggregates fall, the dollar appreciates on impact), and a five-factor version leaves these qualitative conclusions unchanged. At a 60-month horizon the identified policy shock accounts for a sizeable share of the variance of interest rates (45.4% of the funds rate itself, 43.3% of the 3-month T-bill, 40.3% of the 5-year bond) but a much smaller share of real activity and prices (5.4% of industrial production, 3.8% of CPI) and of monetary aggregates (0.5% of both the monetary base and M2); the authors note that IRFs for the monetary aggregates should be interpreted with caution given the low R² of their common components (10.4% and 5.2%, respectively), and they hedge their central claim, describing the price-puzzle result as offering only &amp;ldquo;some support&amp;rdquo; for the view that the puzzle stems from omitted conditioning information rather than a definitive resolution. The sample ends in August 2001, before the financial crisis and the zero lower bound, so the paper does not speak to whether the FAVAR&amp;rsquo;s resolution of the price puzzle extends to that later, constrained-policy environment.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>