<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Neville Francis | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/neville-francis/</link><description>Neville Francis</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/neville-francis/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Is the technology-driven real business cycle hypothesis dead? Shocks and aggregate fluctuations revisited</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/is-the-technology-driven-real-business-cycle-hypothesis-dead-shocks-and-aggregate-fluctuations-revisited/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/is-the-technology-driven-real-business-cycle-hypothesis-dead-shocks-and-aggregate-fluctuations-revisited/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This 2005 &lt;em&gt;Journal of Monetary Economics&lt;/em&gt; paper (circulated as NBER Working Paper 8726, January 2002) subjects a startling empirical result &amp;ndash; that identified &amp;ldquo;technology shocks&amp;rdquo; appear to &lt;em&gt;reduce&lt;/em&gt; labor input, the opposite of what standard real-business-cycle (RBC) theory predicts &amp;ndash; to a battery of plausibility checks, and then asks whether standard dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE) models can be modified, without invoking sticky prices, to match it. The authors begin skeptical of Galí&amp;rsquo;s (1999) long-run-restriction identification of technology shocks, but after deriving additional over-identifying restrictions from a standard growth model, comparing the shock&amp;rsquo;s effects on wages and consumption against the model&amp;rsquo;s qualitative predictions, and testing whether oil shocks, Romer-dated monetary policy changes, or military buildups can explain the identified shock (they cannot, with the lowest p-value only 0.12), the paper concludes the identified disturbance really does look like a technology shock &amp;ndash; &amp;ldquo;a better candidate than the Solow residual for a true technology shock.&amp;rdquo; Facing this result, the authors then show that two flexible-price modifications to a standard DGE model &amp;ndash; one combining habit formation in consumption with investment adjustment costs, the other replacing the production function with a short-run Leontief (fixed-proportions) technology &amp;ndash; can each reproduce a temporary &lt;em&gt;decline&lt;/em&gt; in hours worked after a positive technology shock, through different internal mechanisms than Galí&amp;rsquo;s preferred sticky-price explanation. Despite this success, the authors are explicit that neither modification revives technology shocks as a plausible primary driver of business cycles: in their words, &amp;ldquo;the original technology-driven real business cycle hypothesis does appear to be dead,&amp;rdquo; since the data instead point to a separate, non-technology (&amp;ldquo;demand&amp;rdquo;) shock as the source of the standard positive comovement among output, hours, consumption, and investment that constitutes a textbook business cycle.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>