<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Maximilian Grimm | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/maximilian-grimm/</link><description>Maximilian Grimm</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/maximilian-grimm/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Loose Monetary Policy and Financial Instability</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/loose-monetary-policy-and-financial-instability/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/loose-monetary-policy-and-financial-instability/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This paper provides the first long-run causal evidence that a persistently loose stance of monetary policy — defined as extended periods of low interest rates relative to the neutral rate — significantly raises the probability of a financial crisis several years later. Using a long historical panel of 18 advanced economies (approximately 1870–2020, excluding world wars), the paper estimates local projection (LP) regressions in which the stance is measured as the &lt;strong&gt;5-year backward moving average of (r – r*)&lt;/strong&gt;, with r* from the Del Negro–Giannoni–Gaballo–Tambalotti (DGGT) factor model. The &lt;strong&gt;OLS baseline&lt;/strong&gt; finds that a 1 percentage-point (pp) looser average stance over a 5-year window raises the 3-year financial crisis probability by &lt;strong&gt;2.2pp at a 5–7 year horizon&lt;/strong&gt; and &lt;strong&gt;3.3pp at a 7–9 year horizon&lt;/strong&gt;, against an unconditional base of 10.5%. To address the endogeneity of monetary policy to pre-existing economic conditions, the authors construct an &lt;strong&gt;instrumental variable&lt;/strong&gt; based on the international trilemma of open-economy finance: for countries pegging their exchange rate, changes in the base-country interest rate orthogonal to domestic economic conditions provide exogenous variation in domestic rates, weighted by a capital mobility index. &lt;strong&gt;IV estimates are substantially larger&lt;/strong&gt;: 1pp looser average stance raises crisis probability by &lt;strong&gt;5.5pp at 5–7 years&lt;/strong&gt; and &lt;strong&gt;15.5pp at 7–9 years&lt;/strong&gt;, indicating that OLS understates the causal effect because accommodative policy is endogenously adopted during recessions when crisis risk is already low. The same loose-policy stance significantly raises the probability of entering &lt;strong&gt;R-zones&lt;/strong&gt; — periods of credit market overheating identified by Greenwood, Hanson, Shleifer, and Sørensen (2022) as harbingers of financial crisis — and, with a lag of 6–9 years, raises the probability of &lt;strong&gt;historically low GDP growth&lt;/strong&gt; (below the 20th percentile of the cross-country distribution). The evidence supports a growth-risk tradeoff: loose policy may deliver short-term stimulus, but at a meaningful cost in medium-term financial fragility and real tail risk.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>