<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Mauricio Barbosa-Alves | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/mauricio-barbosa-alves/</link><description>Mauricio Barbosa-Alves</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/mauricio-barbosa-alves/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>International Reserve Management Under Rollover Crises</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/international-reserve-management-under-rollover-crises/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/international-reserve-management-under-rollover-crises/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;The paper extends the Cole-Kehoe (2000) sovereign rollover crisis model to include international reserves and derives the joint optimal management of sovereign debt and reserves in a small open economy subject to potential creditor coordination failure. The central results are: (i) reserves are only valuable as a rollover-crisis defense when debt has sufficiently long maturity; (ii) the optimal exit path from the crisis zone requires holding zero reserves while gradually reducing debt, then jumping simultaneously to the optimal safe pair (a*, b*) by issuing new debt while accumulating reserves; (iii) this seemingly paradoxical debt-financed reserve accumulation lowers bond spreads because it moves the economy fully into the safe zone.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>