<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Matthew Elliott | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/matthew-elliott/</link><description>Matthew Elliott</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/matthew-elliott/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Market Segmentation through Information</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/market-segmentation-through-information/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/market-segmentation-through-information/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This paper asks what market outcomes an information designer — modeled as an internet platform that knows consumers&amp;rsquo; preferences — can achieve by choosing what information to disclose to competing oligopolistic firms who then make personalized price offers. The model features n firms each producing a single differentiated product at zero cost, a continuum of consumers with unit demand and multidimensional valuations (one per product), and a designer who commits to a mapping from consumer types to joint distributions over messages sent to firms before they play a simultaneous pricing game. The designer&amp;rsquo;s objective spans the full range from maximizing producer surplus to maximizing consumer surplus.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>