<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Luca Citino | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/luca-citino/</link><description>Luca Citino</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/luca-citino/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The (In)effectiveness of Targeted Payroll Tax Reductions</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/the-ineffectiveness-of-targeted-payroll-tax-reductions/</link><pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/the-ineffectiveness-of-targeted-payroll-tax-reductions/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This paper studies the cost-effectiveness of targeted payroll tax reductions as a tool for stimulating labor demand among marginalized workers, using a natural experiment from Italy. The motivation is policy-relevant: governments routinely deploy targeted payroll tax cuts to combat youth and low-skill unemployment, but such subsidies risk subsidizing inframarginal hiring — employment that would have occurred without the incentive — rather than creating net new jobs. Rigorous evaluation requires two features that are rarely satisfied simultaneously: (1) the subsidy must target genuinely marginalized workers so estimates pertain to the population of interest, and (2) variation in incentives across firms must be quasi-random so firm responses are causally identified. This paper exploits a policy that satisfies both.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>