<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Luc Laeven | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/luc-laeven/</link><description>Luc Laeven</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/luc-laeven/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Permanent Capital Losses after Banking Crises</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/permanent-capital-losses-after-banking-crises/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/permanent-capital-losses-after-banking-crises/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Question&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This paper investigates two interrelated questions about historical banking crises: (1) whether bank losses during banking crises are primarily temporary or permanent in nature, and (2) whether policy interventions — particularly liquidity-based interventions — are effective at restoring bank capitalization after such crises. The paper positions these questions against a theoretical divide: models stressing temporary price dislocations (binding borrowing constraints, depositor fragility, information frictions) versus models in which crises reflect fundamental and permanent deterioration in the value of bank assets.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>