<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Juan J Cruces | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/juan-j-cruces/</link><description>Juan J Cruces</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/juan-j-cruces/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/sovereign-defaults-the-price-of-haircuts/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/sovereign-defaults-the-price-of-haircuts/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;The paper attacks a long-standing empirical consensus &amp;ndash; that sovereign default carries little or no penalty in credit markets &amp;ndash; by arguing that the consensus rests on a measurement choice. Earlier work coded credit history with a binary default indicator, &amp;ldquo;capturing any missed payment,&amp;rdquo; which throws away the enormous variation in how much creditors actually lose. The authors therefore build the first complete set of present-value haircut estimates for all 180 sovereign debt restructurings with foreign banks and bondholders between 1978 and 2010, covering 68 countries, assembled from nearly 200 sources including IMF archives, offering memoranda, private-sector research and the financial press, and discounted using a new procedure that imputes a deal-specific &amp;ldquo;exit yield&amp;rdquo; from low-grade US corporate yields and the sovereign&amp;rsquo;s rating at the time. The resulting facts are themselves the paper&amp;rsquo;s first contribution: the average haircut is 37% (about 30% volume-weighted), half the cases lie below 23% or above 53%, haircuts rose by roughly 25 percentage points on average between the 1970s-80s and the 1990s-2000s, deals with outright face-value write-offs average 65% against 24% for pure reschedulings, and restructurings by highly indebted poor countries average 87% &amp;ndash; nearly three times the middle-income figure. The sovereign average is far below the 64% the authors cite for US corporate restructurings, which they find &amp;ldquo;surprising because US corporate debt, in contrast to sovereign debt, can be enforced in courts.&amp;rdquo; The second contribution is the link to what happens next. Replicating the standard specification with a binary restructuring dummy reproduces the received result &amp;ndash; spreads 260 basis points higher in year one, around 150 in year two, and insignificant or marginal thereafter &amp;ndash; but substituting the continuous haircut changes the picture: one extra percentage point of haircut goes with EMBI Global spreads about 6.75 basis points higher in year one and still about 3.16 basis points higher in years four and five, so a one-standard-deviation (22 percentage point) increase implies spreads 149 basis points higher in year one and 70 higher in years four to five. In the fully specified model that includes both the haircut and the restructuring dummies, the incremental spread of a restructuring is statistically significant for haircuts above 40% throughout years one to seven, and a one-standard-deviation rise in haircut implies spreads 122 basis points higher in years four and five and 149 higher in years six and seven &amp;ndash; against the at most 50 basis points earlier studies attributed to a past default. On market access, across 67 &amp;ldquo;final&amp;rdquo; restructurings the average time to partial reaccess is 5.1 years (median three), but 2.3 years for haircuts below 30% against 6.1 years above; a Cox proportional hazard model puts a one-percentage-point higher haircut at 2.37% lower odds of reaccess in a given year, so a one-standard-deviation increase (30 percentage points in that sample) implies &amp;ldquo;a 51 percent lower likelihood of reaccess in any given year.&amp;rdquo; The authors are careful about what this does and does not show: they include country and year fixed effects and a large set of fundamentals, but say this &amp;ldquo;mitigates, but not necessarily completely eliminates&amp;rdquo; the risk of an omitted confounder, that the findings &amp;ldquo;should not be interpreted as direct evidence&amp;rdquo; for either punishment or information revelation, and that what they have is &amp;ldquo;indicative evidence&amp;rdquo; of a trade-off rather than an identified channel.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>