<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Jonathan Libgober | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/jonathan-libgober/</link><description>Jonathan Libgober</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/jonathan-libgober/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The Dynamics of Verification when Searching for Quality</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/the-dynamics-of-verification-when-searching-for-quality/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/the-dynamics-of-verification-when-searching-for-quality/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This paper develops a dynamic principal-agent model in which a principal seeks to select exactly one project from a stream of possibilities emerging over time, while a biased agent (who wants any project selected, regardless of quality) reports project quality each period. The principal cannot observe quality directly but can pay a cost c to verify it. Monetary transfers are unavailable. The central question is how verification and selection rules should optimally evolve over time as new options arrive.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>