<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Johannes Wieland | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/johannes-wieland/</link><description>Johannes Wieland</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/johannes-wieland/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The Optimal Inflation Rate in New Keynesian Models: Should Central Banks Raise Their Inflation Targets in Light of the Zero Lower Bound?</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/the-optimal-inflation-rate-in-new-keynesian-models-should-central-banks-raise-their-inflation-targets-in-light-of-the-zero-lower-bound/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/the-optimal-inflation-rate-in-new-keynesian-models-should-central-banks-raise-their-inflation-targets-in-light-of-the-zero-lower-bound/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This 2012 Review of Economic Studies paper by Olivier Coibion, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Johannes Wieland asks what rate of steady-state (trend) inflation maximizes welfare in a New Keynesian DSGE model once the zero lower bound (ZLB) on nominal rates is explicitly modeled, rather than assumed away. The authors build a medium-scale NK model with Calvo staggered price-setting, habit formation in consumption, and a Taylor rule truncated at the ZLB, solving for ZLB episodes&amp;rsquo; endogenous duration using the Bodenstein-Erceg-Guerrieri (2009) nonlinear algorithm; they calibrate the model to standard U.S. moments and to the historical post-WWII frequency of ZLB episodes, and evaluate welfare via a second-order approximation to utility that decomposes into a steady-state term (from Calvo price dispersion) and variance terms in the output gap, inflation, and consumption. In the baseline calibration the optimal trend inflation rate is 1.5% per year &amp;ndash; &amp;ldquo;close to the bottom end&amp;rdquo; of the 1-3% target ranges central banks commonly use &amp;ndash; because, although each ZLB episode is individually costly (an 8-quarter ZLB spell costs the equivalent of a 6.2% permanent consumption loss at 2% trend inflation), such episodes are calibrated to occur only about once every 20 years at 2% inflation, so the unconditional expected cost of the ZLB is small (0.08% of permanent consumption) relative to the perpetual costs of higher trend inflation (steady-state price dispersion, and a previously unidentified channel by which higher trend inflation makes inflation volatility itself more costly). The optimal rate proves robust to a wide range of alternative calibrations and extensions &amp;ndash; remaining under about 3% even when the output-gap loss weight is scaled up 100-fold, capital is added (2.1%), parameter uncertainty is incorporated (1.9%, 90% CI [0.3%, 2.9%]), or the historical ZLB frequency is tripled &amp;ndash; with the risk-premium shock&amp;rsquo;s persistence being the single most sensitive parameter (raising optimal inflation from 1.5% to 3% when its autocorrelation rises from 0.947 to 0.96). The rate is highly sensitive to the assumed monetary and fiscal policy regime, however: optimal inflation falls to about 0.2% under commitment to a stabilization policy, rises to 2.7% under discretion, and falls to well under 0.3% under even a modest price-level-targeting response, and it falls further still, to 0.3%, if downward nominal wage rigidity is added to the model. The authors caveat that their cashless-economy setup ignores the Friedman optimal-deflation motive and seigniorage, and that omitting endogenous countercyclical fiscal policy during ZLB episodes likely overstates both the cost of the ZLB and the resulting optimal inflation rate.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>