<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Hidehiko Matsumoto | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/hidehiko-matsumoto/</link><description>Hidehiko Matsumoto</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/hidehiko-matsumoto/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Monetary and Macroprudential Policies under Dollar-Denominated Foreign Debt</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/monetary-and-macroprudential-policies-under-dollar-denominated-foreign-debt/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/monetary-and-macroprudential-policies-under-dollar-denominated-foreign-debt/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Research question and motivation: Emerging economies have rapidly accumulated foreign-currency (mostly dollar) debt — the dollar share of 14 emerging economies&amp;rsquo; foreign debt rose from 75% in 2010 to 81% in 2018. Such debt is dangerous because sudden stops in capital inflows cause sharp currency depreciation that mechanically raises the domestic-currency value of the debt. The paper asks: when a country holds dollar-denominated foreign debt, does macroprudential policy mitigate depreciation and downturns during sudden stops, how should monetary policy be conducted, and how should the two policies cooperate? Existing sudden-stop models (with loan-to-value/debt-to-income collateral constraints and pecuniary externalities) do not model the channel by which depreciation inflates the value of dollar debt.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>