<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Hans Gersbach | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/hans-gersbach/</link><description>Hans Gersbach</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/hans-gersbach/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Open Rule Legislative Bargaining</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/open-rule-legislative-bargaining/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/open-rule-legislative-bargaining/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This paper revisits the open rule legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) — the dominant workhorse model in political economy for analyzing how legislatures divide a surplus — and provides a more complete characterization of its stationary equilibria. The core research question is whether the equilibrium typically cited in the literature as the &amp;ldquo;open rule equilibrium&amp;rdquo; is actually the unique equilibrium, or whether it rests on implicit and unstated assumptions that, once relaxed, reveal a much richer equilibrium set.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>