<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Gordon B. Dahl | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/gordon-b.-dahl/</link><description>Gordon B. Dahl</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/gordon-b.-dahl/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Unemployment Insurance, Starting Salaries, and Jobs: Evidence from Multi-state Firms</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/unemployment-insurance-starting-salaries-and-jobs-evidence-from-multi-state-firms/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/unemployment-insurance-starting-salaries-and-jobs-evidence-from-multi-state-firms/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Seven U.S. states permanently cut unemployment insurance (UI) benefits by 30–64 percent between 2011 and 2014, providing the study&amp;rsquo;s quasi-experimental variation. North Carolina enacted the largest reform: maximum duration fell from 26 weeks to 12–20 weeks and maximum weekly benefits fell from $535 to $350, an average total reduction of 64 percent. Six &amp;ldquo;moderate reform&amp;rdquo; states (FL, GA, KS, MI, MO, SC) cut duration only, by an average of 30 percent (26→18 weeks). Using a multi-state firm identification strategy — comparing establishments of the same firm operating in reform states against the same firm&amp;rsquo;s establishments in non-reform states, with establishment and firm×year fixed effects — the paper estimates causal effects of UI cuts on employment (EEOC, 946K–1.4M establishment-years), starting salaries (Glassdoor, 500K–942K person-years), and posted wages (Burning Glass Technologies, 709K–1.18M establishment-job-quarters). The main results: NC establishments gain &lt;strong&gt;+1.3% employment&lt;/strong&gt; on average relative to same-firm establishments in other states (ATT), reaching +2.1% by year 2; moderate reform states gain +0.8% (ATT). Starting salaries of new hires fall &lt;strong&gt;−5.5% in NC&lt;/strong&gt; and −1.2% in moderate states. Posted wages for the same job within the same firm fall &lt;strong&gt;−3.5% in NC&lt;/strong&gt; and −3.2% in moderate states. The negative co-movement of employment and wages identifies a &lt;strong&gt;labor supply shock&lt;/strong&gt;: workers lower reservation wages in response to reduced outside options; firms take advantage by hiring more at lower wages. Labor demand elasticity: −0.36 (SE 0.21) for NC, −0.42 (SE 0.18) for moderate states. The larger effects in NC relative to moderate reform states are consistent with the larger total benefit reduction; effects are robust to controlling for concurrent right-to-work laws, minimum wage changes, Medicaid expansions, and corporate/personal tax reforms. The paper concludes that large, permanent UI reductions can raise employment but at the cost of lower starting wages.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Why Is Workplace Sexual Harassment Underreported? The Value of Outside Options amid the Threat of Retaliation</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/why-is-workplace-sexual-harassment-underreported-the-value-of-outside-options-amid-the-threat-of-retaliation/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/why-is-workplace-sexual-harassment-underreported-the-value-of-outside-options-amid-the-threat-of-retaliation/</guid><description>&lt;h3 id="research-question-and-argument"&gt;Research question and argument&lt;/h3&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dahl and Knepper address the long-standing puzzle of why workplace sexual harassment is chronically underreported despite high estimated prevalence. Survey evidence indicates that no fewer than 1 in 28 U.S. workers report annual victimization, yet only 1 in 11,000 workers files a formal charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Even following the #MeToo movement, formal charges rose only about 10%, leaving an enormous gap unexplained.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>