<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>François Le Grand | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/francois-le-grand/</link><description>François Le Grand</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/francois-le-grand/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Optimal Fiscal Policy with Heterogeneous Agents and Capital: Should We Increase or Decrease Public Debt and Capital Taxes?</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/optimal-fiscal-policy-with-heterogeneous-agents-and-capital-should-we-increase-or-decrease-public-debt-and-capital-taxes/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/optimal-fiscal-policy-with-heterogeneous-agents-and-capital-should-we-increase-or-decrease-public-debt-and-capital-taxes/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;The Chamley-Judd result (1986) states that the optimal long-run capital income tax rate is zero in representative-agent models. This paper shows that introducing heterogeneous agents — specifically, agents with uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk who use precautionary saving — overturns this result. When agents differ in their wealth and income realizations, a capital income tax serves as a form of insurance that representative-agent models cannot provide. The paper derives a tractable analytical characterization of the optimal capital tax in an Aiyagari-type heterogeneous-agent model and finds that the optimal rate lies in the range of 10–30 percent at the steady state — strictly positive, in direct contradiction to Chamley-Judd. The magnitude of the optimal tax depends on the degree of idiosyncratic risk and the availability of alternative redistribution instruments: when other redistributive tools are limited, the optimal capital tax is higher.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Should Monetary Policy Care about Redistribution? Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy with Heterogeneous Agents</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/should-monetary-policy-care-about-redistribution-optimal-monetary-and-fiscal-policy-with-heterogeneous-agents/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/should-monetary-policy-care-about-redistribution-optimal-monetary-and-fiscal-policy-with-heterogeneous-agents/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Question.&lt;/strong&gt; Should monetary policy deviate from price stability to address redistributive concerns in an economy with heterogeneous agents? The paper jointly solves for optimal monetary and fiscal policy under commitment in a Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) environment with incomplete insurance markets for idiosyncratic risk, nominal frictions (Rotemberg price adjustment costs), and aggregate technology shocks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Framework.&lt;/strong&gt; The model is a Bewley-style incomplete-markets economy populated by a continuum of agents who differ in their idiosyncratic labor productivity histories. Agents save in two assets — nominal public debt and real capital shares — and face nominal borrowing constraints. Intermediate firms operate under monopolistic competition and face quadratic price adjustment costs. The government has up to five fiscal instruments: linear taxes on real capital income, on nominal asset income, and on labor income; lump-sum transfers; and one-period public nominal debt. Monetary policy controls the path of the nominal interest rate, and thereby inflation.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>