<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Felipe Brugués | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/felipe-brugues/</link><description>Felipe Brugués</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/felipe-brugues/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Take the Goods and Run: Contracting Frictions and Market Power in Supply Chains</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/take-the-goods-and-run-contracting-frictions-and-market-power-in-supply-chains/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/take-the-goods-and-run-contracting-frictions-and-market-power-in-supply-chains/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This paper studies the efficiency of self-enforced relational agreements in manufacturing supply chains when sellers have market power and contracts cannot be externally enforced. The setting is Ecuador, an upper-middle-income country with slow commercial courts (debt enforcement takes around two years even after a 2016 reform) and highly concentrated manufacturing markets (average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of 0.6 for 6-digit economic codes, well above the 0.25 threshold used by the US Department of Justice to identify highly concentrated markets).&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>