<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Fan Liang | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/fan-liang/</link><description>Fan Liang</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/fan-liang/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Adverse Selection and Small Business Finances</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/adverse-selection-and-small-business-finances/</link><pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/adverse-selection-and-small-business-finances/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This paper asks why small firms hold large quantities of liquid assets — cash and cash equivalents that earn low or negative real returns — even when external credit is available. The conventional answer is a precautionary motive: liquidity buffers the risk of being shut out of credit markets. Liang proposes a second, complementary motive: a signaling motive, whereby firms hold liquid assets specifically to pledge as collateral and credibly signal their repayment ability to lenders, thereby obtaining better loan terms. The empirical backdrop is striking: about 28% of small business assets are cash and cash equivalents (Kauffman Firm Survey 2011 wave); about 7% of commercial business loans are secured by liquid collateral (SSBF 2003); and 43% of small firms sought a commercial business loan in 2020.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>