<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Etienne Lalé | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/etienne-lale/</link><description>Etienne Lalé</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/etienne-lale/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Zero-hours Contracts in a Frictional Labour Market</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/zero-hours-contracts-in-a-frictional-labour-market/</link><pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/zero-hours-contracts-in-a-frictional-labour-market/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Dolado, Lalé, and Turon build a structural equilibrium model of the U.K. low-wage labour market to evaluate zero-hours contracts (ZHCs), employment agreements under which firms are not required to guarantee any minimum working hours and workers may decline any hours offered. The paper&amp;rsquo;s central question is whether ZHCs raise or lower welfare in general equilibrium, and through which channels. The model features two-sided heterogeneity in a random-search-and-matching environment: firms differ in the volatility of their labour demand, workers differ in their relative preferences for flexible versus regular employment, and wages are fixed at or near the statutory minimum wage. Three mechanisms operate simultaneously. First, a job-creation effect: firms facing highly volatile demand that cannot profitably hire under regular terms enter the market only because ZHCs exist. Second, a substitution effect: some firms that could hire under regular contracts instead post ZHC vacancies, crowding out regular employment. Third, a labour-force-participation effect: workers with a strong preference for flexible schedules join the labour force specifically because ZHCs exist and would withdraw if ZHCs were banned.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Disincentive effects of unemployment insurance benefits</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/disincentive-effects-of-unemployment-insurance-benefits/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/disincentive-effects-of-unemployment-insurance-benefits/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This paper isolates the disincentive effects of pandemic unemployment insurance (UI) benefits on employment recovery, separating them from the simultaneously operating stimulative (demand) effects that previous studies conflate. The authors study the largest UI expansion in U.S. history — the CARES Act of March 2020 — which introduced three simultaneous provisions: a $600 weekly income supplement (FPUC) through end of July 2020, a 13-week extension of maximum benefit duration (PEUC), and expanded eligibility to workers previously ineligible for UI (PUA), together raising the median replacement rate to 145% and more than doubling the number of UI recipients.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Life-cycle worker flows and cross-country differences in aggregate employment</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/life-cycle-worker-flows-and-cross-country-differences-in-aggregate-employment/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/life-cycle-worker-flows-and-cross-country-differences-in-aggregate-employment/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research question.&lt;/strong&gt; The paper asks: what are the sources of cross-country differences in aggregate employment across European economies, and which types of worker flows — between employment (E), unemployment (U), and nonparticipation (N) — drive those differences? The authors pay particular attention to heterogeneity by gender and age, motivated by the observation that cross-country employment dispersion is concentrated among women, youth, and older workers, and that a large portion of the dispersion is traceable to differences in labor force participation rather than unemployment rates alone.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>