<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Dirk Bergemann | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/dirk-bergemann/</link><description>Dirk Bergemann</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/dirk-bergemann/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Screening and Segmenting: A Consumer Surplus Perspective</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/screening-and-segmenting-a-consumer-surplus-perspective/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/screening-and-segmenting-a-consumer-surplus-perspective/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Bergemann, Heumann, and Wang study consumer surplus when a monopolist simultaneously engages in second-degree price discrimination (screening consumers within each market segment through quality-differentiated menus) and third-degree price discrimination (offering different menus across segments). The central question is which market segmentation maximizes aggregate consumer surplus, and under what conditions any segmentation benefits consumers at all.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The model features a monopolist selling vertically differentiated goods of quality q at strictly convex cost c(q) to a continuum of buyers with privately known values v drawn from an aggregate market m*. A segmentation is any decomposition of m* into submarkets, each receiving a profit-maximizing screening menu. The seller observes segment identity but not individual values. The problem of finding the consumer-optimal segmentation is, on its face, an optimization over distributions of distributions — an infinite-dimensional object.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>