<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Diego Jiménez-Hernández | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/diego-jimenez-hernandez/</link><description>Diego Jiménez-Hernández</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/diego-jimenez-hernandez/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Contract Terms, Employment Shocks, and Default in Credit Cards</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/contract-terms-employment-shocks-and-default-in-credit-cards/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/contract-terms-employment-shocks-and-default-in-credit-cards/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research Question&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This paper asks two related questions bearing on financial inclusion policy in developing countries: (1) How effective are credit card contract term changes — specifically interest rate reductions and minimum payment increases — in limiting default among new borrowers? (2) How large is the effect of formal-sector job loss on default relative to these contract term interventions, and can the difference in magnitudes be explained by differential cash flow impacts?&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>