<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>David Bügel | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/david-bugel/</link><description>David Bügel</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/david-bugel/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Unconventional but Different After All? A Unified Series of Narrative Monetary Policy Shocks</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/unconventional-but-different-after-all-a-unified-series-of-narrative-monetary-policy-shocks/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/unconventional-but-different-after-all-a-unified-series-of-narrative-monetary-policy-shocks/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Asking whether unconventional monetary policy works differently from an interest-rate cut has been hard to answer because the two kinds of policy have been measured with different tools, so any difference in the estimated effects could be a difference in the measuring rather than in the policy. This paper builds one shock series for both, running Romer and Romer&amp;rsquo;s (2004) narrative regression — policy-rate changes on the Federal Reserve&amp;rsquo;s own Greenbook/Tealbook forecasts — but substituting Wu and Xia&amp;rsquo;s (2016) shadow rate for the federal funds rate over the 2009–16 zero-lower-bound period, which yields shocks for 1969–2008 and 2009–16 built the same way. Estimating local projections on the pooled sample with a structural break at the zero lower bound, the authors cannot reject equality of the peak responses of the interest rate, industrial production, unemployment and the consumer price index across regimes (p-values from 0.09 to 0.56), which they read as unconventional policy being about as effective as rate cuts for aggregate activity. Joint Wald tests do reject equality for wealth shares and for the stock-to-house price ratio, and the sign flips: an expansionary conventional shock normalised to 25 basis points lowers the top 10% wealth share by about 0.3% at the trough, while the equivalent unconventional shock raises it by up to about 0.36% and lowers the middle 40% share by about 0.7%. The authors attribute the difference to asset prices — unconventional easing raises the stock-to-house price ratio by over 3% where conventional easing lowers it by about 3.13% — and a mechanical revaluation of Survey of Consumer Finances portfolios reproduces the pattern, with the equity-heavy top 10% capturing most of the gains and households in the bottom groups, who hold little equity and often no housing, receiving comparatively little. The distributional evidence rests on short samples — 1989–2008 for conventional and 2009–15 for unconventional shocks, at quarterly frequency — and the authors do not address the Fed-information-effect and Fed-reaction-to-news concerns directly, assessing them only indirectly by comparison with shock series that are robust to them.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>