Traditional Institutions in Modern Times: Dowries as Pensions When Sons Migrate

This paper asks whether dowry — a transfer from the bride’s family to the groom’s household upon marriage, prevalent throughout India — enables male migration by providing liquidity that compensates parents for the old-age support they would otherwise lose when sons leave the village. The core friction is that in patrilocal societies, sons traditionally co-reside with parents and share income in old age; migration disrupts this arrangement and introduces income-sharing frictions (limited commitment, information asymmetries, remittance costs). Dowry attenuates this friction by providing a liquid pool of resources at the time of marriage that the son can transfer to parents, lowering the net return to migration needed for a household to find migration optimal.

Corinne Low | Macro Paper Warehouse

Traditional Institutions in Modern Times: Dowries as Pensions When Sons Migrate