<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Cecilia Dassatti | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/cecilia-dassatti/</link><description>Cecilia Dassatti</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/cecilia-dassatti/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Loan Evergreening through Banks' Lenses: Evidence from Credit Product-Level Data</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/loan-evergreening-through-banks-lenses-evidence-from-credit-product-level-data/</link><pubDate>Wed, 01 Jan 2025 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/loan-evergreening-through-banks-lenses-evidence-from-credit-product-level-data/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Research question and motivation.&lt;/strong&gt; Banks reluctant to recognize losses on troubled borrowers engage in &amp;ldquo;loan evergreening&amp;rdquo;—rolling over or extending credit to delay loss recognition. This misdirected lending has been blamed for Japan&amp;rsquo;s Lost Decade and Europe&amp;rsquo;s post-crisis stagnation by steering credit to unproductive firms. Observing &lt;em&gt;how&lt;/em&gt; banks do this, and their regulatory motives, is empirically hard. The paper studies a specific, previously hard-to-observe evergreening strategy that arises from banks&amp;rsquo; incentive to avoid loan-loss provisions, which increase convexly as repayment delays lengthen.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>