<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Boaz Abramson | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/boaz-abramson/</link><description>Boaz Abramson</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/boaz-abramson/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Rent Guarantee Insurance</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/rent-guarantee-insurance/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/rent-guarantee-insurance/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Abramson and Van Nieuwerburgh study Rent Guarantee Insurance (RGI), a product in which an insurer pays the landlord on behalf of a tenant who defaults on rent due to a negative income or health expenditure shock, in exchange for a monthly premium proportional to rent. The central question is whether RGI can be designed to be both welfare-improving and financially viable, given the frictions of moral hazard and adverse selection.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>