https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/aram-grigoryan/Aram GrigoryanHugo -- gohugo.ioen-ushttps://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/school-choice-and-the-housing-market/https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/school-choice-and-the-housing-market/<p>Grigoryan (2021) develops a unified general-equilibrium framework that jointly models school assignment mechanisms and the housing market to evaluate the welfare and distributional consequences of replacing traditional neighborhood assignment (NA) with the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism. The paper fills a gap in the matching theory literature, where preferences and priorities are typically treated as exogenous, by making residential choices endogenous: families first observe which school assignment mechanism the district announces, then optimally select a neighborhood given market-clearing prices and other families&rsquo; choices, and finally children are assigned to schools through the announced mechanism.</p>