https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/anna-russo/Anna RussoHugo -- gohugo.ioen-ushttps://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/additionality-and-asymmetric-information-in-environmental-markets-evidence-from-conservation-auctions/https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/additionality-and-asymmetric-information-in-environmental-markets-evidence-from-conservation-auctions/<p>This paper investigates the problem of additionality — the likelihood that a conservation action is marginal to (i.e., caused by) an incentive — in the United States Department of Agriculture&rsquo;s Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), one of the largest and most mature Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) mechanisms in the world. The CRP pays landowners $1.6–$1.8 billion per year under 10-year contracts to retire cropland and plant grass mixes, trees, or wildlife habitats, using a discriminatory scoring auction in which landowners submit bids on a menu of heterogeneous contracts ranked by a scoring rule.</p>