<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Andrés Velasco | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/andres-velasco/</link><description>Andrés Velasco</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/andres-velasco/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Joined at the Hip: Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Liquidity-Dependent World</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/joined-at-the-hip-monetary-and-fiscal-policy-in-a-liquidity-dependent-world/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/joined-at-the-hip-monetary-and-fiscal-policy-in-a-liquidity-dependent-world/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Calvo and Velasco study an economy where both money and government bonds provide liquidity services, and they show that this shared role implies bond-financed fiscal expansions can be neutral or contractionary — not merely less effective than hoped. The mechanism turns on a fundamental asymmetry: the price of money in terms of goods is pinned down by sticky prices, whereas the price of long-term bonds is free to jump immediately in response to expected changes in bond supply. When the government announces a future bond-financed transfer to households, bond prices fall right away, compressing total liquidity before a single new bond is actually issued; the liquidity-in-advance constraint then forces aggregate demand and output down, producing a recession that precedes and is qualitatively separable from any subsequent boom. The paper maps four distinct timing cases — unanticipated permanent, anticipated permanent, unanticipated transitory flow, and unanticipated temporary stock — and shows each has a different (and sometimes opposite) short-run sign for output. To prevent these contractionary liquidity effects, the central bank must cut the interest rate on money and expand the money supply in ways that are precisely coordinated with the timing of the bond helicopter drop; in this sense fiscal and monetary authorities are, the authors conclude, joined at the hip. The paper also distinguishes this result from standard fiscal-dominance stories: the monetary authority is not compelled to finance the deficit but to stabilize bond prices in order to protect aggregate demand.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>