<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Amory Gethin | Macro Paper Warehouse</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/amory-gethin/</link><description>Amory Gethin</description><generator>Hugo -- gohugo.io</generator><language>en-us</language><atom:link href="https://macropaperwarehouse.com/authors/amory-gethin/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>Distributional Growth Accounting: Education and the Reduction of Global Poverty, 1980–2019</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/distributional-growth-accounting-education-and-the-reduction-of-global-poverty-19802019/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/distributional-growth-accounting-education-and-the-reduction-of-global-poverty-19802019/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;This paper constructs the first estimates of the aggregate and distributional effects of worldwide educational expansion since 1980 by developing a &amp;ldquo;distributional growth accounting&amp;rdquo; framework that isolates the contribution of schooling to economic growth by income group. The framework integrates the canonical labor supply-and-demand model of education and the wage structure (à la Goldin and Katz 2007) with standard growth accounting tools, applied to a new microdatabase covering household surveys in 150 countries and representative of approximately 95% of the world&amp;rsquo;s population, alongside new country-specific estimates of private returns to primary, secondary, and tertiary schooling. Under conservative assumptions — relying on standard Mincerian returns, assuming capital income is unaffected by schooling, and abstracting from human capital externalities — education can account for approximately 50% of global economic growth, 70% of income gains among the world&amp;rsquo;s poorest 20% of individuals, and 40% of extreme poverty reduction since 1980; it also explains over 50% of improvements in the share of labor income accruing to women. A key mechanism is imperfect substitutability between skill groups: as educational expansion raises the supply of skilled workers, their relative wage falls, redistributing income toward low-skilled workers and amplifying education&amp;rsquo;s equalizing effect at the bottom of the distribution — a channel that canonical cross-country growth accounting misses, causing it to underestimate education&amp;rsquo;s contribution to poverty reduction by a factor of approximately three. Combining these indirect investment benefits from education with direct government redistribution (from a companion paper) brings the total contribution of public policies to extreme poverty reduction to at least 50%.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item><item><title>Global Working Hours</title><link>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/global-working-hours/</link><guid>https://macropaperwarehouse.com/papers/global-working-hours/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;Drawing on about 5,000 labor force and household surveys from 160 countries that cover 97% of the world&amp;rsquo;s population, this paper builds a new global database of hours worked and shows that hours worked per adult decline only slightly with GDP per capita and are weakly correlated with economic development overall: the unconditional elasticity of hours with respect to GDP is about -0.04 across countries and -0.01 within countries over time, GDP explains roughly 5% of cross-country and under 1% of within-country historical variation in hours, and the implied reduction is 0-20% over the entire development spectrum. The strong age and gender gradients the authors document are, in their cross-country regressions, driven less by development itself than by institutions: hours worked by the young (aged 15-19) and the elderly (aged 60+) fall with development almost entirely because of rising school attendance and public pension coverage, while prime-age (20-59) hours stay roughly flat but undergo what the authors call a &amp;ldquo;great gender reshuffling,&amp;rdquo; in which falling male hours per worker are quantitatively offset by rising female labor force participation. Across countries and over time, labor taxes are strongly negatively correlated with prime-age hours worked; controlling for government transfers only partly reduces this link, which the authors read as ruling out income and substitution effects on labor supply as the &lt;em&gt;only&lt;/em&gt; driver, while controlling for working-hours regulations and the size of the formal sector reduces the link much more sharply, suggesting to them that regulation—not just the incentive effects of taxes—plays a large role in shortening intensive-margin hours in richer countries. The authors conclude that collective choices and social norms, often encoded in public policy (schooling, pensions, cultural norms about women&amp;rsquo;s work, and hours regulation), powerfully shape working hours over and above pure economic development. These are correlational cross-country and time-series patterns rather than identified causal effects, and hours are measured as weekly hours in all GDP-producing jobs (including unpaid agricultural work but excluding unpaid home services).&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>